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SEX DISCRIMINATION BY LAW: A STUDY
IN JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE
JOHN D. JOHNSTON, JR.
CHARLES L. KNAPP*
In this article, the authors analyze a uide variety of cases in
which the courts have dealt with sex discrimination by law and
conclude that the performance of American judges in this area has
generally ranged from "poor to abominable." Arguing that many
of the considerations which have led to the invalidation of racially
discriminatory laws are equally present when legislative classifica-
tions are based on sex, they suggest that the general failure of the
courts to perceive this point may be due to certain deeply ingrained
attitudes that judges share with a majority of American males.
The authors therefore conclude by proposing several counter-
measures which judges may employ to overcome any male bias and
bring a more objective outlook to the resolution of sex discrimina-
tion issues.
INTRODUCTION
W OMEN'S liberation is: a slogan-a challenge-a movement
-a threat-a cliche-an enigma-or something else, de-
pending on who you are. It is not surprising that "women's lib"
connotes different things to different people; their perceptions of
it reflect differing social and cultural backgrounds and varying
levels of sensitivity to the disadvantages inflicted on some mem-
bers of society solely for being female. It follows that any con-
tribution (pro or con) to the growing body of "women's lib"
literature is likely to be disparaged by some readers as the prod-
uct of an uninformed mind or a distorted sense of values. It can
thus be easily dismissed, on the ground of fatal bias-intentional,
subconscious, or naive-by anyone who has strong opposing feel-
ings on the subject.
Though mindful of these pitfalls, we nevertheless tender
our own analysis of judicial attitudes toward the relationship
between the sexes, gleaned from opinions in cases involving sex-
based discrimination. We do not claim to be particularly, much
less uniquely, qualified to comment on such matters. Each of us
is a middle-aged, white male-some might characterize us as
fairly typical WASPs, of the subspecies "law professor." Neither
* Professors of Law, New York University School of Law. The authors grate-
fully acknowledge the assistance of four New York University law students, Messrs.
Douglas Behr, Lawrence Vaughan, Darman Wing and Richard Wolf, each of whom
performed research which is reflected in the discussion that follows.
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of us has ever been radicalized, brutalized, politicized or other-
wise leaned on by the Establishment in any of the ways that in
recent years have led many to adopt heretical views of various
kinds.
Each of us, however, was led last year-one through bar
association activity,' the other in response to questions from fe-
male students about the property rights of women-to begin to
investigate the ways in which American judges have responded
to various types of sex discrimination 2 Our research has been
of the most traditional kind: finding, analyzing, attacking and
defending judicial opinions. We believe that our selection of cases
is representative, though admittedly far from exhaustive.
Our conclusion, independently reached, but completely
shared, is that by and large the performance of American judges
in the area of sex discrimination can be succinctly described as
ranging from poor to abominable. With some notable exceptions,
they have failed to bring to sex discrimination cases those judi-
cial virtues of detachment, reflection and critical analysis which
have served them so well with respect to other sensitive social
issues. Particularly striking, we believe, is the contrast between
judicial attitudes toward sex and race discrimination. Judges
have largely freed themselves from patterns of thought that can
be stigmatized as "racist"-at least their opinions in that area
exhibit a conscious attempt to free themselves from habits of
stereotypical thought with regard to discrimination based on
color. With respect to sex discrimination, however, the story is
different. "Sexism"-the making of unjustified (or at least un-
supported) assumptions about individual capabilities, interests,
goals and social roles solely on the basis of sex differences-is as
easily discernible in contemporary judicial opinions as racism
ever was.
We will attempt to demonstrate this thesis through a sam-
pling of what American judges have said in opinions in sex dis-
crimination cases over the past hundred years. Some opinions
contain assertions that are, by any rational analysis, overt dec-
I Professor Knapp was a member of the Committee on Federal Legislation
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, which studied proposed
constitutional amendments designed to redress discrimination on the basis of sex.
The committee's findings appear in Report, Amending the Constitution to
Prohibit State Discrimination Based on Sex, 26 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 77 (1971).
2 "Sex discrimination" can be used in a generic sense, connoting differing
treatment of individuals solely on the basis of their sex. It can also be used in a
pejorative sense to denote those situations in which inequality of treatment is
designed to benefit one sex to the detriment of the other. Except where the
context indicates otherwise, we will use the term in the former sense.
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larations of "male supremacy." In others, more or less objective
rationales for sex discrimination are advanced. The relatively
few (and for the most part quite recent) decisions invalidating
sex discrimination will also receive consideration, substantively
and as possible precursors of a changing judicial attitude.
We make no particular claim for the originality of any of
the ideas expressed in the discussion that follows. Indeed, it
seems to us that most of them have probably been expressed al-
ready by others, although sometimes in a different form or con-
text.' We have, however, attempted to compile, from judicial
opinions in several major areas of sex discrimination by law,
those arguments and statements that most clearly reveal the atti-
tudes shaping judicial decisions. We will avoid protracted dis-
cussion of particular questions of constitutional doctrine, such
as the precise interpretation and application of the due process
and equal protection clauses; we also prefer not to join the in-
creasingly heated debate over the desirability of a new "Equal
Rights" amendment.4 We have avoided emphasizing these issues
in part because of our lack of constitutional expertise, but also
because we are convinced that preoccupation with legal doctrine
has left largely unexplored the surprising extent to which the
survival of sex discrimination can be attributed to pervasive
judicial attitudes.
We have investigated a number of areas in which the states
discriminate by law on the basis of sex. Taken individually, some
may appear of less than overwhelming importance; in the aggre-
gate, however, they encompass a broad spectrum of activity,
affecting women in several significant aspects of their relation-
ship to society.5
3 Some of the most valuable references are: L. Kanowitz, Women and the
Law (1969); Crozier, Constitutionality of Discrimination Based on Sex, 15 B.U.L.
Rev. 723 (1935); Murray & Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimina-
tion and Title VII, 34 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 232 (1965); Note, Sex Discrimination
and Equal Protection: Do We Need A Constitutional Amendment?, 84 Harv. L.
Rev. 1499 (1971); Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1109 (1971) ; Note, Sex
Discrimination and the Constitution, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 691 (1950). Also of interest is
Brown, Emerson, Falk and Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitu-
tional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 Yale L.J. 871 (1971), which appeared
as this article was going to press.
4 For a recent exchange of views on the subject by eminent constitutional
lawyers, see Symposium, Equal Rights for Women: A Symposium on the Pro-
posed Constitutional Amendment, 6 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 215
(1971). See also Brown, Emerson, Falk and Freedman, The Equal Rights Amend-
ment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, supra note 3.
5 A March 1970 memorandum of the Citizens' Advisory Council on the
Status of Women lists 15 specific areas of sex discrimination:
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II
SEx DlsCIN ATION BY LAW
A. Professional and Occupational Restrictions
1. Practice of Law
One of the earliest Supreme Court decisions upholding sex
discrimination by state action was Bradwell v. Illinois.6 In that
case the Illinois Supreme Court had denied a woman's applica-
tion for a license to practice law solely because she was a female.
Although the state statute delegating to the court authority over
bar admissions made no specific provision for the exclusion of
females, the state court found this to have been the legislative
intent and denied the application. It assumed that at the time
the statute was enacted the legislators held certain fixed ideas
about the roles of the sexes: "That God designed the sexes to
occupy different spheres of action, and that it belonged to men
to make, apply, and execute the laws was regarded as an almost
axiomatic truth."'
1. State laws placing special restrictions on women with respect to hours
of work and weightlifting on the job;
2. State laws prohibiting women from working in certain occupations;
3. Laws or practices operating to exclude women from State colleges and
universities (including higher standards required for women applicants
to institutions of higher learning and in the administration of scholar-
ship programs) ;
4. Discrimination in employment by State and local governments;
5. Dual pay schedules for men and women public school teachers;
6. State laws providing for alimony to be awarded, under certain circum-
stances, to ex-wives but not to ex-husbands;
7. State laws placing special restrictions on the legal capacity of married
women or on their right to establish a legal domicile;
8. State laws that require married women but not married men to go
through a formal procedure and obtain court approval before they may
engage in an independent business;
9. Social Security and other social benefits legislation which give greater
benefits to one sex than to the other;
10. Discriminatory preferences, based on sex, in child custody cases;
11. State laws providing that the father is the natural guardian of the
minor children;
12. Different ages for males and females in (a) child labor laws, (b) age
for marriage, (c) cutoff of the right to parental support, and (d)
juvenile court jurisdiction;
13. Exclusion of women from the requirements of the Military Selective
Service Act of 1967;
14. Special sex-based exemptions for women in selection of State juries;
15. Heavier criminal penalties for female offenders than for mae offenders
committing the same crime.
116 Cong. Rec. E2588 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1970). We shall treat in some detail
the first three and the last two items on this list. In addition, we will discuss
discrimination in places of public accommodation and with respect to recovery for
loss of consortium.
6 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
7 Id. at 132.
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The petitioner appealed this ruling to the Supreme Court on
constitutional grounds. There was no opposing counsel, but none
was needed since only Chief Justice Chase dissented from the
decision affirming the denial of the application.
The opinion of the court was mainly addressed to the peti-
tioner's claim that the state court's action violated the privileges
and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. This claim
was rejected on the ground that the petitioner, having become a
citizen of Illinois, could no longer claim the protection of that
clause. The court further indicated that, in any event, admission
to law practice was not one of the privileges or immunities of a
citizen of the United States.
The opinion did not expressly refer to equal protection. This
may be attributable to the fact that, in the Slaughterhouse Cases8
decision handed down just prior to Bradwell, the Court had ex-
pressly limited the scope of fourteenth amendment equal pro-
tection to cases involving racial discrimination.'
The most interesting feature of the case, however, is the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley, in which two of his
brethren joined. As an affirmation of God's grand design for the
sexes, we believe it is unexcelled in legal literature. The signifi-
cant passages are the following:
The claim that, under the fourteenth amendment of the Con-
stitution, which declares that no State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States, the statute law of Illinois, or the common
law prevailing in that State, can no longer be set up as a barrier
against the right of females to pursue any lawful employment
for a livelihood (the practice of law included), assumes that it
is one of the privileges and immunities of women as citizens to
engage in any and every profession, occupation, or employment
in civil life.
It certainly cannot be affirmed, as an historical fact, that this
has ever been established as one of the fundamental privileges
and immunities of the sex. On the contrary, the civil law, as well
as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the
respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or
should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The
8 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
9 We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way
of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their
race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this [equal protec-
tion] provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that
emergency, that a strong case would be necessary for its application to any
other.
Id. at 81.
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constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the
divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain
and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity,
of interests and views which belong, or should belong, to the
family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting
a distinct and independent career from that of her husband. So
firmly fixed was this sentiment in the founders of the common
law that it became a maxim of that system of jurisprudence that
a woman had no legal existence separate from her husband, who
was regarded as her head and representative in the social state;
and, notwithstanding some recent modifications of this civil status,
many of the special rules of law flowing from and dependent upon
this cardinal principle still exist in full force in most States. One
of these is, that a married woman is incapable, without her hus-
band's consent, of making contracts which shall be binding on
her or him. This very incapacity was one circumstance which
the Supreme Court of Illinois deemed important in rendering a
married woman incompetent fully to perform the duties and
trusts that belong to the office of an attorney and counsellor.
It is true that many women are unmarried and not affected
by any of the duties, complications, and incapacities arising out
of the married state, but these are exceptions to the general rule.
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the
noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of
the Creator. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the
general constitution of things, and cannot be based upon ex-
ceptional cases.
The humane movements of modern society, which have for
their object the multiplication of avenues for woman's advance-
ment, and of occupations adapted to her condition and sex, have
my heartiest concurrence. But I am not prepared to say that it
is one of her fundamental rights and privileges to be admitted
into every office and position, including those which require highly
special qualifications and demanding special responsibilities. In
the nature of things it is not every citizen of every age, sex and
condition that is qualified for every calling and position. It is the
prerogative of the legislator to prescribe regulations founded on
nature, reason, and experience for the due admission of qualified
persons to professions and callings demanding special skill and
confidence. This fairly belongs to the police power of the State;
and, in my opinion, in view of the peculiar characteristics, destiny,
and mission of woman, it is within the province of the legislature
to ordain what offices, positions, and callings shall be filled and
discharged by men, and shall receive the benefit of those energies
and responsibilities, and that decision and firmness which are
presumed to predominate in the sterner sex.' 0
Unfortunately, the reader is not favored with any indication
of the manner by which this "divine ordinance" was transmitted
by the Creator to Mr. Justice Bradley.
10 83 U.S. (16 Wall) at 140-42.
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Twenty-one years after Bradwell, the Supreme Court
affirmed another state's denial of a woman's application for ad-
mission to law practice. In In re Lockwood,11 the petitioner had
already been admitted to the bars of the Supreme Court and the
District of Columbia (and allegedly of several other states as
well). A Virginia statute provided that any "person"l who had
been previously admitted to practice in any state or in the Dis-
trict of Columbia could also practice in Virginia's courts. The
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia simply construed "person"
to mean "male" and denied the petition. The primary issue for
the Supreme Court was the state court's interpretation of the
statute. In a short opinion for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice
Fuller refused to issue a writ of mandamus ordering petitioner's
admission to practice. As in Bradwell, there was no mention of
equal protection; and, of course, Bradwell had already fore-
closed the privileges and immunities argument.
The Supreme Court has not decided any other cases involv-
ing exclusion of women from the practice of law. It is quite clear
by now, of course, that the equal protection clause does apply
to state regulation of bar admissions and that a denial of admis-
sion on grounds having no "rational connection with the appli-
cant's fitness or capacity to practice law" is invalid. 2 By the
time these principles became clearly recognized, however, total
exclusion of women from law practice was no longer an active
problem. Thus, Bradwell and Lockwood remain the only Su-
preme Court decisions on the subject.
It is inconceivable, were the issue to arise, that any court
today would conclude that there is a rational basis for the total
exclusion of women from law practice. In this area, God's grand
design has thus been overtaken by the demonstrated fact that
women are not, as a class, inherently unfit to practice law.'3 As
11 154 U.S. 116 (1894).
12 See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 262 (1957); Schware v. Board
of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957).
13 In 1949, then U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Thomas C. Clark
described women lawyers in the following words:
As lawyers they have demonstrated their ability in all phases of law....
Any debate as to their legal ability would be as obsolete as a discussion on
the merits of Woman Suffrage. .. [Y]ou can depend upon a woman
lawyer for a careful painstaking legal job .... The legal profession has
been immeasurably strengthened by the presence of women lawyers.
Tally, Women Lawyers of Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 46 Women Lawyers
J., Summer, 1960, at 21, 23-24.
Women have proved themselves to be capable practitioners and have risen to
important positions within the legal profession:
According to the United States Department of Labor, about 175 women
were judges of Federal, State, County, and City courts in 1955 ....
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
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we shall see, however, the attitudes revealed by Justice Bradley
have been widely shared by American judges and have decisively
influenced their response whenever the validity of sex discrimi-
nation has been called into question.
2. Sale of liquor
The states undoubtedly possess broad powers over the sale
of intoxicating beverages. 4 State regulation has frequently in-
cluded restrictions on the issuance of bartending licenses to
women unless they are closely related to the male owner of a
licensed establishment. A Michigan statute prohibiting the issu-
ance of a bartending license to a female, unless the wife or
This figure does not include women justices of the peace. In 1957 a woman
was presiding judge of the Sixth Circuit ... of the United States Court
of Appeals, the highest judicial post ever held by a woman in the United
States. Another woman was judge of the United States District Court,
one of the fifteen judges for the District of Columbia. In California, a
woman was, as of 1957, an associate Justice of the Tax Court of the
United States and a woman was appointed a judge of the United States
Customs Court in June, 1955, the second woman to hold this post ....
Harris, Women and the Law, 47 Women Lawyers J., Winter, 1961, at 20, 21.
Furthermore, the number of women sitting as judges has now risen to 200 and
the number of female federal district judges has increased to three. There is still
only one woman on the United States courts of appeals. Sassower, Women in
the Law: The Second Hundred Years, 57 A.B.A.J. 329, 330-31 (1971). Neverthe-
less, the legal profession remains male dominated; women lawyers constitute only
about 3% of the total. Moreover, this percentage has remained virtually constant
over the past 20 years. The percentage from 1948 to 1966 rose only from 1.8 to
2.8%. The 1967 Lawyer Statistical Report 15 (Well ed. 1968).
After admission to the bar, women encounter further discrimination. In a
study of women lawyers, James J. White found on the basis of a questionairc
study that "males make a lot more money than do the females." White, Women
in the Law, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 1051, 1057 (1967). Furthermore, the practices of
women lawyers seem to be centered around certain areas: "The proportion of
females engaged in trusts and estates (60%), domestic relations (50%) and tax
(31%) [was] higher than the proportion of men engaged in these activities.
These data accord with the commonly held beliefs about women's practice." Id. at
1062. See generally Dinerman, Sex Discrimination in the Legal Profession, 55
A.B.A.J. 951 (1969); Sassower, Women in the Law: The Second Hundred Years,
57 A.B.A.J. 329 (1971); Testimony Submitted by the Women's Rights Comm. of
N.Y.U. School of Law for Hearings Conducted by the House Subcomni. on Educ.,
116 Cong. Rec. H7980 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1970).
14 The twenty-first amendment provides that "the transportation or importa-
tion into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or
use therein of intoxicating liquors in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby
prohibited." U.S. Const. amend. XXI, § 2. This amendment has been interpreted
as relaxing the usual commerce clause limitations on state regulation of the
liquor trade. Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1964);
Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131, 140 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 137-38 (1939). The amendment does not,
however, similarly relax the due process and equal protection guarantees of the
fourteenth amendment. See Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S.
35 (1966); Parks v. Allen, 409 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1969); Krauss v. Sacramento
Inn, 314 F. Supp. 171, 177-78 n.6 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 46:675
HeinOnline -- 46 N.Y.U. L. Rev.  682 1971
SEX DISCRIMINATION
daughter of an owner, was challenged on equal protection grounds
in Goesaert v. Cleary."5
The principal defect complained of, however, was not the
general exclusion of women from bartending but the exception
made in favor of wives and daughters of owners. Appellant's
contention was that this exception had no rational basis. The
statute was nevertheless upheld by the court, voting six-to-three.
Writing for the court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter declared:
Michigan could, beyond question, forbid all women from working
behind a bar. This is so despite the vast changes in the social
and legal position of women. The fact that women may now have
achieved the virtues that men have long claimed as their preroga-
tives and now indulge in vices that men have long practiced, does
not preclude the States from drawing a sharp line between the
sexes, certainly in such matters as the regulation of the liquor
traffic. See the Twenty-First Amendment and Carter v. Virginia,
321 U.S. 131. The Constitution does not require legislatures to
reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards, any more
than it requires them to keep abreast of the latest scientific
standards.""
The majority obviously did not perceive any serious equal pro-
tection problems arising from a complete exclusion of women
from bartending.17 But what is the rational basis for exclusion,
in terms of fitness or capacity to be a bartender? The opinion
contains only a vague reference to "moral and social problems"
against which the state is permitted to protect itself. Nothing
else.
Having concluded that total exclusion would be upheld, the
majority then considered the validity of Michigan's exception:
Since bartending by women may, in the allowable legislative judg-
ment, give rise to moral and social problems against which it may
devise preventive measures, the legislature need not go to the full
length of prohibition if it believes that as to a defined group of
females other factors are operating which either eliminate or
reduce the moral and social problems otherwise calling for prohibi-
tion. Michigan evidently believes that the oversight assured
through ownership of a bar by a barmaid's husband or father
minimizes hazards that may confront a barmaid without such
15 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
16 Id. at 465-66.
17 The three-judge district court from which the appeal had been taken was
no more enlightening in its discussion of the legislative intent, referring to a con-
ceivable (but unspecified) "grave social problem" that could be created by female
bartenders and to the likelihood that male owners would be motivated to maintain
a "wholesome atmosphere" if their wives or daughters were tending bar. The
statute was then categorized as a "special provision for the protection of women."
Goesaert v. Cleary, 74 F. Supp. 735, 739 (E.D. Mich. 1947).
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protecting oversight. This Court is certainly not in a position to
gainsay such belief by the Michigan legislature. If it is entertain-
able, as we think it is, Michigan has not violated its duty to afford
equal protection of its laws. We cannot cross-examine either ac-
tually or argumentatively the mind of Michigan legislators nor
question their motives. Since the line they have drawn is not
without a basis in reason, we cannot give ear to the suggestion
that the real impulse behind this legislation was an unchivalrous
desire of male bartenders to try to monopolize the calling.' s
The three dissenters did not comment upon the majority's
assertion that total exclusion of women from bartending would
be valid. Instead, they dissented only because the exception op-
erated in favor of female relatives of a male owner, but did not
extend to daughters of a female owner-or, for that matter, to a
female owner herself. This fact convinced them that the legis-
lature was not actually motivated by "solicitude for the moral
and physical well-being" of would-be female bartenders. Further-
more, they concluded that such solicitude would be the "only
conceivable justification" for this type of discrimination. The
opinion of the Court did not respond to the dissenters' argument.
Perhaps the most striking feature of the case, though, is
the fact that in 1948 no member of the Court openly challenged
the assertion that, in the interest of protecting itself against un-
specified "social problems," a state could exclude all women from
the occupation of bartending. The opinion displays only token
adherence to the requirement that, in order for a legislative clas-
sification to be valid, there must be a rational connection be-
tween the classification and some proper legislative goal. Since
this is usually the minimum requirement for upholding a state
statute against an equal protection challenge, the Court clearly
did not consider the statute to be class legislation in the area of
protected civil liberties, to be sustained only if a compelling state
interest in the classification is shown.19
Prior to Goesaert, a number of state courts had sustained
similar statutes, brushing aside constitutional challenges with
expressions of deference to legislative judgment in matters of
18 335 U.S. at 466-67.
19 For a general discussion of the difference between the usual "reasonable
classification" test of equal protection and the more strict "compelling state
interest" test applied to certain "suspect" classifications, see Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065 (1969). For a recent illustration
of the manner in which the determination of the applicable test may affect the
result of a case, see Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
The Supreme Court has never held that sex discrimination is inherently
suspect, nor has it ever invalidated such discrimination by applying the "reason-
able classification" test. See note 206 infra.
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((public morality.""2 A rare exception was the unanimous deci-
sion by the Supreme Court of Florida21 invalidating a statute
which prohibited women from serving "liquor by the drink over
any bar or counter." The short opinion is couched mainly in
substantive due process terms, ignoring the array of contrary
decisions in other states.
In cases decided after Goesaert, state courts have tended to
rely heavily on that opinion in sustaining statutes against con-
stitutional challenge.22 At least two state courts, however, have
repudiated the reasoning of Goesaert and similar cases.
In Paterson Tavern & Grill Owners Association, Inc. v.
Borough of Hawthorne,23 the Supreme Court of New Jersey in-
validated a local ordinance which excluded women from bar-
tending. Noting that Goesaert had been the subject of critical
academic comment, the court concluded that its precedential
value was highly questionable. Having so concluded, however,
the court nevertheless declined to invalidate the ordinance on
equal protection grounds. Rather, it declared that the ordinance
exceeded the borough's delegated police power, "in the light of
current customs and mores,324 and the court thereby limited its
holding to the specific regulation presented~l Thus, it appears
that the New Jersey court will now seriously test any sex-based
20 See, e.g., City of Hoboken v. Goodman, 68 N.J.L. 217, 51 A. 1092 (Sup.
Ct. 1902): "The supposed evil aimed at is the employment of women in connec-
tion with a traffic likely to induce vice and immorality." Id. at 221, 51 A. at 1093.
Sce also State v. Considine, 16 Wash. 358, 364, 47 P. 755, 757 (1897):
The legislature is the supreme authority, within constitutional limitations,
to determine what is and what is not an immoral business or a nuisance,
and when it has so determined, its enactment is valid unless the legislative
act is clearly partial, arbitrary, and oppressive. The prohibition of employ-
ment of a female person in the statute under which defendant was con-
victed uniformly applies to all persons employing, and who are engaged
in a like business with defendant, and extends to all female persons
employed.
Fifty years later, the pattern remained the same. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Liquor
Control Comm'n, 316 Mich. 83, 105, 25 N.W.2d 118, 127 (1946): "The extent
to which the legislature may be influenced by a newer conception . . . as to the
rights of women in employment and in social life, and particularly to act as
bartenders in licensed liquor establishments, is for the legislature, and it only, to
decide."
21 Brown v. Foley, 198 Fla. 734, 29 So. 2d 870 (1947).
22 E.g., Hargens v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 263 Cal. App.
2d 601, 69 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Ct. App. 1968); State v. Burke, 79 Idaho 209, 312
P.2d 806 (1957).
23 57 N.J. 180, 270 A.2d 628 (1970).
24 Id. at 186, 270 A.2d at 631.
25 A similar technique was employed by the New Jersey courts to invalidate
an ordinance prohibiting women from being served liquor at a bar unless seated.
Gallagher v. City of Bayonne, 106 NJ. Super. 401, 256 A.2d 61 (Super. Ct. App.
Div.), aff'd, 56 N.J. 159, 259 A.2d 912 (1969). See text accompanying notes 89-90
infra.
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discriminatory legislation to determine whether it has any rational
basis; indeed, it might eventually be persuaded to employ an
equal protection rationale in such cases.
In invalidating a California statute prohibiting female bar-
tenders,26 however, that state's supreme court refused to confine
itself to such a limited rationale. Its unanimous decision in
Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby27 is the most far-reaching state court
decision on the subject of sex discrimination, and seems destined
for landmark status.
In Sailer Inn, several bar owners who were employing fe-
male bartenders sought a writ of mandamus to prevent the state's
alcoholic beverage control authority from revoking their liquor
licenses in consequence of their violation of the statute. The
court might have held that the statute had been impliedly re-
pealed by a 1970 amendment to the California Fair Employ-
ment Practices Act expressly barring sex discrimination. 8 This
would not have been a novel holding29 and by itself would have
furnished a sufficient ground for granting the requested relief.
The court chose, however, to address itself to questions of
greater import.
Initially, the court considered petitioners' contention that
the state statute had been superseded, as a matter of federal
supremacy, by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 0 Title
VII prohibits any employer under its coverage"' from discrimi-
nating on the basis of sex except where a "bona fide occupational
qualification" is concerned. In harmony with a growing body of
authority,32 the court held that the state law was superseded by
Title VII as to those petitioners whose employers were subject
thereto, the state having failed to advance sufficient facts to
justify excluding females from the occupation of bartending.
Furthermore, the court could have rested its decision solely
26 This statute declared it a misdemeanor for a female to serve as a bartender
and subjected both employer and employee to criminal sanctions. It also contained
an exception for female owners of bars and wives of male owners. Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code § 25656 (West 1964).
27 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
28 Cal. Labor Code §§ 1411-12 (West 1971).
29 See, e.g., Longacre v. State, 448 P.2d 832 (Wyo. 1968).
3o Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-16, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1964).
The effect of Title VII on state regulation of employment conditions is considered
more fully in the next section.
31 Employers with fewer than 25 employees are exempt from Title VII.
Id. § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1964). Apparently some, but not all, of the
employers in Sai'er Inn were exempt on this ground. See 485 P.2d at 532 n.4, 95
Cal. Rptr. at 332 n.4.
32 See text accompanying notes 69-74 infra.
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upon a provision of the California constitution which prohibits
the disqualification of any person, on account of sex, "from
entering or pursuing a lawful business, vocation, or profession."
33
An early precedent had construed the provision as follows:
As we understand the section, it does establish, as the permanent
and settled rule and policy of this State, that there shall be no
legislation either directly or indirectly incapacitating or disabling
a woman from entering on or pursuing any business, vocation, or
profession permitted by law to be entered on and pursued by those
sometimes designated as the stronger sex.... [T]here are no ex-
ceptions in this section, and neither we nor any other power in the
State have the right or authority to insert any, whether on the
ground of immorality or any other ground. All these are considera-
tions of policy, the determination of which belonged to the con-
vention framing and the people adopting the Constitution; and
their final and conclusive judgment has been expressed and entered
in the clear and unmistakable language of the Constitution it-
self .... 34
The Sail'er Inn opinion accepted this view: "[A]ithough an
inability to perform the tasks required by a particular occupa-
tion, sex-linked or not, may be a justification for discrimination
against job applicants, under section 18, mere prejudice, how-
ever ancient, common or socially acceptable, is not."3 5
Three arguments were presented to the Sail'er Inn court
in support of the proposition that women are in some respects
less able to perform the duties of a bartender. First, it was con-
tended that women are incapable of preserving order and pro-
tecting patrons of a bar. The court answered:
This argument ignores modern day reality. Today most bars, un-
like the saloons of the Old West, are relatively quiet, orderly and
respectable places patronized by both men and women. Even if
they were not, many bars employ bouncers whose sole job is to
keep order in the establishment. Furthermore, the experience in
the states which permit women to tend bar indicates that the dire
moral and social problems predicted by the Attorney General do
not arise.36
Second, the statute was said to be a measure for protecting
women against injury at the hands of inebriated customers. The
court replied:
The desire to protect women from the general hazards inherent
in many occupations cannot be a valid ground for excluding them
from those occupations under section 18. Women must be per-
3 Cal. Const. art. 20, § 18 (West 1954).
34 In re Maguire, 57 Cal. 604, 608 (1881) (emphasis added).
35 485 P.2d at 533, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
36 Id. at 533-34, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 333-34.
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initted to take their chances along with men when they are other-
wise qualified and capable of meeting the requirements of their
employment .... We can no more justify denial of the means of
earning a livelihood on such a basis than we could deny all women
drivers' licenses to protect them from the risk of injury by drunk
drivers. Such tender and chivalrous concern for the well-being of
the female half of the adult population cannot be translated into
legal restrictions on employment opportunities for women
37
Finally, it was argued that the statute tends to prevent "im-
proprieties and immoral acts." The court responded:
Section 18 in no way prevents the Legislature from dealing effec-
tively with the evils and dangers inherent in selling and serving
alcoholic beverages; it merely precludes resort to legislation
against women rather than against the particular evil sought to
be curbeds
Concluding that the statute was in conflict with the constitutional
provision, the court declared it void.
This construction of the state constitutional provision relat-
ing to sex discrimination in business and employment furnished
ample basis for granting the relief sought by the petitioners in
Sail'er Inn; it was therefore unnecessary for the court even to
consider the application of the equal protection clauses of the
California and United States constitutions. 9 Nevertheless, the
court did reach this question-and its discussion of equal pro-
tection is clearly the most significant part of the opinion.
The court properly recognized that the initial issue was
which equal protection test to apply. Conceding that the Supreme
Court had never expressly so held, the court nevertheless con-
cluded that "fundamental interests" were affected and that the
cstrict scrutiny" test was therefore appropriate. The court per-
ceived two reasons for applying this high standard to the
statute: it infringed upon the "fundamental right to pursue a
lawful profession," and it involved a sex classification, which
"should be treated as suspect.140 The court's discussion of the
latter point is particularly apt and persuasive. After noting
several cases in which the Supreme Court had applied this test
to such classifications as race and national origin,41 the court
then drew this analogy to sex classification:
37 Id. at 534, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
38 Id.
39 The court asserted that the clauses are substantially identical, citing
County of Los Angeles v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Cal. 2d 378, 196 P.2d 773
(1948). 485 P.2d at 538 n.13, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 338 n.13.
40 485 P.2d at 939, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
41 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
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Sex, like race and lineage, is an immutable trait, a status
into which the class members are locked by the accident of birth.
What differentiates sex from nonsuspect statuses, such as intelli-
gence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized
suspect classification is that the characteristic frequently bears
no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.... The
result is that the whole class is relegated to an inferior legal status
without regard to the capabilities or characteristics of its indivi-
dual members.... Where the relation between characteristic and
evil to be prevented is so tenuous, courts must look closely at
classifications based on that characteristic lest outdated social
stereotypes result in invidious laws or practices.
Another characteristic which underlies all suspect classifica-
tions is the stigma of inferiority and second class citizenship as-
sociated with them .... Women, like Negroes, aliens, and the
poor have historically labored under severe legal and social
disabilities. Like black citizens, they were, for many years, denied
the right to vote and, until recently, the right to serve on juries
in many states. They are excluded from or discriminated against
in employment and educational opportunities. Married women in
particular have been treated as inferior persons in numerous laws
relating to property and independent business ownership and the
right to make contracts.
Laws which disable women from full participation in the
political, business and economic arenas are often characterized as
"protective" and beneficial. Those same laws applied to racial or
ethnic minorities would readily be recognized as invidious and
impermissible. The pedestal upon which women have been placed
has all too often, upon closer inspection, been revealed as a cage.
We conclude that the sexual classifications are properly treated
as suspect, particularly when those classifications are made with
respect to a fundamental interest such as employment.4 2
The court then considered the state interests allegedly served
by the statute. The state had argued that female bartenders
might commit "improprieties" and that they would be an "un-
wholesome influence" on bar patrons. The first contention was
rejected with these comments:
This rationale fails as a compelling state interest because it is
wholly arbitrary and without support in logic or experience.
Where the evil which the Legislature seeks to prevent can be di-
rectly prevented through nondiscriminatory legislation, and where
the class singled out by the Legislature has no necessary connec-
tion with the evil to be prevented, the statute must be struck down
as an invidious discrimination against that class.43
The second argument fared no better:
The claim of unwholesomeness is contradicted by statutes which
permit women to work as cocktail waitresses, serve beer and wine
42 485 P.2d at 540-41, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 340-41.
43 Id. at 542, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
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from behind a bar (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25655), or tend bar if
they or their husbands hold a liquor license. The objection appears
to be based upon notions of what is a "ladylike" or proper pursuit
for a woman in our society rather than any ascertainable evil
effects of permitting women to labor behind those "permanently
affixed fixtures" known as bars. Such notions cannot justify dis-
crimination against women in employment.
44
The court's conclusion was stated with devastating simplicity:
"The state has not only failed to establish a compelling interest
served by [the statute], but it has failed to establish any interest
at all. ' 45 The statute was held to be violative of the equal pro-
tection clauses of the California and federal constitutions.
Sail'er Inn is a remarkable decision. Although a few other
state and federal courts have invalidated various types of sex
discrimination on constitutional grounds, this opinion is by far
the most penetrating. The California court is the first state
court of last resort to accept the thesis that sex is a "suspect"
classification. The same conclusion has been reached by at least
one lower federal court,46 but Sail'er Inn appears at this time to
be the most persuasive opinion addressed to the constitutional
question. If other courts are moved to adopt this test of equal
protection in the area of sex discrimination, then a greater
incidence of success by those attacking sex classifications in
future cases can be anticipated.
Sailer Inn may even have an influence upon those courts that
choose not to apply the "strict scrutiny" standard to sex classifi-
cations. The California court's finding that the state had shown
"no interest at all" in support of the statute suggests that the
exclusion of women from bartending would not have survived
even the "rational basis" test of equal protection. If other courts
can be persuaded to follow this example and carefully analyze
any alleged state interests that are advanced to justify sex
discrimination, then it is likely that future decisions will more
frequently accord with Sail'er Inn in result, if not precisely in
legal theory.
Finally, Sail'er Inn must be recognized as a challenge to the
Supreme Court to reexamine its traditional position on the
constitutionality of sex discrimination, since the California statute
was expressly held to be in violation of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Although the court made a ritual
44 Id. at 542, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
45 Id. at 543, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
46. United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968).
Cf. White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966); Commonwealth v.
Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968).
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attempt to distinguish Goesaert,47 the main thrust of the Sail'er
Inn opinion is irreconcilable with the sexist assumptions under-
lying that case, and the California court has in effect rejected
its authority. This is an open invitation to the Supreme Court to
reexamine Goesaert and similar decisions in the light of contem-
porary understanding of sex discrimination.
Finally, we note a recent case involving alleged discrimina-
tion against men.48 A New York statute required the fingerprinting
of all male employees of liquor wholesalers. A wholesaler whose
license was cancelled for failure to comply with the fingerprinting
requirement brought an action to have his license restored, on
the ground that the requirement was discriminatory and therefore
invalid.
This contention was rejected by the court on the ground that
a rational basis exists for requiring fingerprints of male employees
only. The legislature, it said, must have been concerned about the
possibility that "strong-arm" tactics would be used by wholesalers
against retailers in order to obtain business (a practice apparently
dating back to Prohibition). In addition, the legislature apparently
concluded that wholesalers would be likely to employ men for this
purpose, but not women. Conceding this reasoning to be "slightly
tenuous,140 the court nevertheless deferred to the legislative de-
termination.
Sophisticated training in the use of physical force against
another person is, of course, widely available to both men and
women. Women who have mastered karate, judo or the use of
firearms can injure or kill an adversary as easily as any man.
How, then, can the legislative distinction be rationally justified?
Only, it would seem, by clear evidence that women would not
in fact utilize their destructive capabilities to further such illegal
solicitation. The court concluded that such utilization would be
"highly improbable," but failed to suggest any basis for this
conclusion. Recent arrests of mugging gangs including females
suggest that the conclusion is tenuous at best. This 1970 decision
47 The court distinguished Goesaert on the ground that the Michigan statute
permitted women to tend bar only under circumstances where a close male
relative was the actual owner of the bar and presumably could be expected to
supervise the female bartender's activities. The California statute, on the other
hand, contained an exception which allowed female owners to tend bar even in
the absence of a male "protector." 4S5 P.2d 543, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 343. Thus
Goesaert's protectionist rationale could not sustain the California statute.
43 Vintage Soc'y Wholesalers Corp. v. State Liquor Authority, 63 Misc. 2d
287, 311 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
49 Id. at 289, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
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plainly demonstrates the stubborn persistence of the old myth
of woman as a frail and delicate creature.
3. Wrestling
In its expression of male dissatisfaction with women's chang-
ing status, and of willingness to obstruct further change wherever
possible, State v. Hunter5 is a remarkable recent descendant of
Mr. Justice Bradley's opinion in Bradwell v. Illinois."1 An Oregon
statute regulating wrestling "exhibitions" totally excluded fe-
males from participation. The court upheld it against an equal
protection challenge, purporting to find a rational basis for the
exclusionary classification:
We believe that we are justified in taking judicial notice of the
fact that the membership of the legislative assembly which enacted
this statute was predominantly masculine. The fact is important in
determining what the legislature might have had in mind with
respect to this particular statute, in addition to its concern for
the public weal. It seems to us that its purpose, although some-
what selfish in nature, stands out in the statute like a sore thumb.
Obviously it intended that there should be at least one island on
the sea of life reserved for man that would be impregnable to the
assault of woman. It had watched her emerge from long tresses
and demure ways to bobbed hair and almost complete sophistica-
tion; from a creature needing and depending upon the protection
and chivalry of man to one asserting complete independence. She
had already invaded practically every activity formerly considered
suitable and appropriate for men only. In the field of sports she
had taken up, among other games, baseball, basketball, golf,
bowling, hockey, long distance swimming, and racing, in all of
which she had become more or less proficient, and in some had
excelled. In the business and industrial fields as an employe or as
an executive, in the professions, in politics, as well as in almost
every other line of human endeavor, she had matched her wits
and prowess with those of mere man, and, we are frank to concede,
in many instances had outdone him. In these circumstances, is it
any wonder that the legislative assembly took advantage of the
police power of the state in its decision to halt this ever-increasing
feminine encroachment upon what for ages had been considered
strictly as manly arts and privileges? Was the Act an unjust and
unconstitutional discrimination against woman? Have her civil
or political rights been unconstitutionally denied her? Under the
circumstances, we think not.52
This passage reveals, as clearly as any we have seen, that male
judges are now fully aware of the growing dissatisfaction of many
women with their male-imposed subordinate status. Significantly,
50 208 Ore. 282, 300 P.2d 455 (1956).
51 See text accompanying note 10 supra.
52 208 Ore. at 287-88, 300 P.2d at 457-58.
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judges will even concede that, once admitted to many of the
spheres of human activity formerly denied them, women have
performed at least as competently as men. Nevertheless, this
court openly applauds legislative resistance to further female
"encroachment," disdaining to conceal its male bias behind any
protectionist facade such as the preservation of women's health or
the prevention of "social problems." Candor, yes. Even-handed
administration of justice by an impartial tribunal, no. Indeed,
the opinion virtually glories in its own revealed bias.
The same issue was raised recently in New York, where
the State Athletic Commission refused to license female wrest-
lers.3 An action seeking to invalidate this rule was dismissed
by the Appellate Division'; with the following comments:
It has been argued that females have fared less well under the
Equal Protection Clause than have males of certain minority
groups which have long been the victims of discrimination....
Furthermore, the presumption of constitutionality of a classifica-
tion requires the courts to assume the existence of a reasonably
conceivable state of facts to sustain it.... It has also been sug-
gested that the Commission's determination is founded on a mid-
Victorian concept which females have long since abandoned and
which has no place in this enlightened last third of the Twentieth
Century. Notwithstanding any personal opinion or attitude we
may hold in this respect, there is legal justification and support,
under the legislation which created the Commission, for the de-
termination made by it. 5
Even assuming that the court has stated the proper equal pro-
tection test, what "reasonably conceivable state of facts" justifies
this particular discriminatory classification? Stating a test is no
substitute for applying it. At an earlier point, the opinion con-
tains a vague reference to past "infestation" of boxing and
wrestling by "undesirable elements." Even if this is true, what is
the rational connection between such infestation and the chal-
lenged rule? The court was silent. While the opinion is by no
means an expression of overt sexism like State v. Hunter, it is
also a far from satisfactory exposition of the reasoning process
by which the decision was reached. If there was any rational basis
for the exclusion of women from wrestling, it does not emerge
from a reading of the opinion.
53 N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 8906 (McKinney 1961) confers upon the com-
mission "sole control . . . over all licenses to ... persons who participate in . . .
wrestling matches or exhibitions." Pursuant to this authorization, Rule A-14, deny-
ing wrestling licenses to women, was promulgated.
54 Calzadilla v. Dooley, 29 App. Div. 2d 152, 286 N.Y.S.2d 510 (4th Dep't
196S).
5 Id. at 156-57, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 516 (emphasis added).
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4. Appointment of Administrators
Unlike corporate fiduciaries, individuals do not customarily
make a business of serving as executors or administrators. In
that respect, a limitation upon service by women in these
fiduciary capacities is not a business or professional exclusion.
But competent estate administration does require, among other
things, sound judgment, administrative ability and an under-
standing of business practices. Male domination of the business
world is a historical fact, although not nearly so pronounced now
as previously. 6 In view of all this, may the legislature validly
mandate a preference for males over females in the appointment
of administrators?
This is the question raised by Reed v. Reed.5 7 In Idaho,
persons applying for letters of administration are entitled to
judicial consideration according to a statutory order of priorities.
The statute favors certain classes of relatives of the decedent
over others and prefers all eligible relatives before creditors."8
Certain persons are completely disqualified, including nonresi-
dents, infants, criminals and those adjudged incompetent to
perform the duties of administrator "by reason of drunkenness,
56 The National Association of Bank Women reports that 270 women are
bank chairmen or presidents, 20 are senior vice-presidents and 50 are executive
vice-presidents. For Women, A Difficult Climb to the Top, Bus. Week, Aug. 2,
1969, at 42, 44. "The National Association of Bank Women, Inc .... is an orga-
nization of 6,431 women holding bank corporate titles .... [M]embership
includes about one-third of all women officers in the country." Foster, Executive
Potential on the Distaff Side, Business, June 1969, at 47. Moreover, about 10%
of all accountants and 2% of all CPA's are women. A. King, Career Opportunities
for Women in Business 68 (1963).
Many women also have less specialized business experience. In 1968, over one
million women were managers, officials or proprietors. U.S. Dep't of Labor,
Women's Bureau Bull. No. 294, 1969 Handbook on Women Workers 90 (1969).
Also, over 16,000 or 58.8% of women workers held white collar jobs. Id. Finally,
406 women earned master's degrees in business and commerce (2.7% of the
degrees awarded), and 106 earned degrees in economics (9.5% of the total). Afore
than 5,000 bachelor's degrees in business and commerce (8.6%) and over 1,000
degrees in economics were awarded to women. Id. Furthermore, in 1956, there
were 5,900 women life insurance agents, about 31 of the total full-time under-
writers. At the same time women made up about 1% of the agency managers
and assistants. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Women's Bureau Bull. No. 229, Life Insurance
Selling, Careers for Women as Life Underwriters 5 (1961).
57 93 Idaho 511, 465 P.2d 635 (1970), prob. juris. noted, 401 U.S. 934
(1971).
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improvidence or want of understanding or integrity."" Within
any eligible class the probate court may grant letters to more
than one person. 0 The controversial requirement is this: "Of
several persons claiming and equally entitled to administer,
males must be preferred to females .... 1
The disqualification provision makes it clear that the court
is not required to prefer incompetent males over competent fe-
males; on the other hand, it also plainly shows that the purpose
of the male preference provision could not be simply to prevent
the selection of incompetent females. Rather, among members of
the highest eligible category, none of whom is otherwise dis-
qualified, the court is required to give preference to males.
In Reed, the decedent was survived by both adoptive par-
ents. Each parent applied separately for letters of administration,
and the probate court obeyed the legislative command by ap-
pointing the father. The mother then challenged this appointment
on the ground that the male preference provision denied her
equal protection of the laws. She was successful in the district
court, but that judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court of
Idaho.
That court purported to apply the "rational connection"
test to determine whether or not the male preference requirement
was so arbitrary and capricious as to violate equal protection.
It was able to suggest two possible motives for the legislature's
action: (1) promotion of prompt settlement of estates by curtail-
ing disputes over the appointment of administrators; and (2) a
feeling that men are generally better qualified than women to act
as administrators. The second proposition apparently troubled
the court somewhat, prompting this further amplification:
While this classification may not be entirely accurate, and there
are doubtless particular instances in which it is incorrect, we are
not prepared to say that it is so completely without a basis in fact
as to be irrational and arbitrary.6
Both of these rationales are faulty, even if one concedes that
the appropriate standard of judicial review is "rational connec-
tion." There is an obviously legitimate state interest in expediting
the process of estate administration; that does not mean, how-
ever, that every means by which this interest may be furthered
is rational. Requiring every successful applicant to have red
hair or demonstrate a capability to jog two miles in sixteen
GO Id. § 15-317.
60 Id. § 15-315.
01 Id. a 15-314.62 93 Idaho at 514, 465 P.2d at 638.
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minutes would undoubtedly reduce the number of competitors
for appointment and thereby curtail litigation, but such require-
ments would have no rational connection with fitness to act as an
administrator. The expediting-of-appointments argument is thus
clearly a makeweight.
The second rationale, then, must be the decisive one. The
court suggested that the Idaho Legislature had apparently deter-
mined that, as compared with men, women are generally deficient
in business acumen. Nevertheless, the court conceded that such
a characterization was not universally accurate; hence, a partic-
ular female applicant might in fact be as well or even better
qualified to administer an estate than her male counterpart.
Despite the obvious possibility that such cases will arise, the
statute leaves the probate judge no discretion: Where the appli-
cants are equally qualified, the male must be appointed; indeed,
he must be preferred to the female even if he is in fact demon-
strably less qualified. A clearer case of arbitrariness can hardly
be imagined.
Perhaps the pernicious effect of the male preference require-
ment can be further illuminated by consideration of an analogous
statute discriminating on the basis of race rather than sex.
63
Suppose the Idaho Legislature had enacted a similar statute which
mandated a preference for whites over nonwhites. Also, suppose
that a particular decedent had no immediate family or that no
member of his family wished to administer his estate; conse-
quently, creditors of the estate would be eligible for appointment
as administrator. Also suppose that the estate has only two
creditors: Ebony Trust Co. and Joe's Grocery. The senior trust
officer of the former (a black man) and the proprietor of the
latter (white) have applied for letters of administration. While
the grocer is a respected citizen operating a successful business,
he did not finish high school, and has never served as a personal
representative. Unless disqualified "for want of understanding or
integrity," however, he must be appointed.
The trust officer appeals from the order of appointment,
challenging the statute on equal protection grounds. Both argu-
ments advanced by the court in Reed could be relevant here: the
statutory preference for whites could help to avoid time-consum-
ing controversies; and it might be shown that, on the average,
whites have more formal education, more responsible jobs and
more business experience than blacks.
63 Analogies to racial discrimination will also be suggested with regard to
other specific issues discussed in later sections. The general aptness of the race
analogy to sex discrimination cases is considered in Section IIIH, infra.
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Would these two arguments be sufficient to sustain the
hypothetical statute against the trust officer's constitutional
attack? Obviously not: the statute is based on an assumption of
racial inferiority that is clearly invidious as applied to this in-
dividual appellant.
Can the statute in Reed be logically distinguished from this
hypothetical statute? We would suggest that it cannot. Both
types of discrimination rest on the fallacious assumption that
generalizations which can accurately be made about a class as a
whole are equally accurate with respect to each individual mem-
ber of the class. In addition, statutes mandating various types of
sex discrimination have reinforced a historical pattern of male
domination over females. In this respect, such statutes serve the
same function as statutes discriminating on the basis of race:
they support and strengthen the power of one group (and its
individual members) to dominate the members of another.
5. The "Judicial Process" in Female Exclusion Cases
With the notable exceptions of Paterson Tavern & Grill
Owners Association and Sail'er Inn, the opinions considered so far
reveal three distinct forms of rationalization used to uphold
state legislation that excludes or disadvantages females with
respect to various occupations or offices. These include: (1)
express reliance on a mythology of male supremacy, which con-
fines women to a subordinate social role and then patronizingly
"protects" them against even their own attempts to change that
role; (2) total deference to the legislature, despite serious asser-
tions that its discriminatory enactments violate specific constitu-
tional guarantees; and (3) cursory dismissal of these serious
constitutional issues, on the basis of inadequately supported
conclusions that rational connections do exist between sex dis-
crimination and the promotion of some vaguely articulated state
interest. The first of these is crude, unjudicial and offensive to
an increasingly large number of both men and women. The other
two are inadequate substitutes for clear thinking and reasoned
analysis. Taken together, they constitute a pattern of flagrant
judicial insensitivity to the injustice visited upon women by male-
dominated state legislatures.
This pattern, we believe, will also be evident in the areas
surveyed in the remainder of our discussion.
B. Labor Regulation
It is a transcendent irony that one of the most celebrated
and widely respected decisions in the history of the Supreme
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Court has, after sixty-odd years, come to be viewed as a "road-
block to the full equality of women." 64 The case is, of course,
Muller v. Oregon,65 Brandeis brief and all. Muller, it will be
remembered, upheld the constitutionality of an Oregon statute
that restricted the employment of women in any "mechanical
establishment, or factory, or laundry" to ten hours per day.
Three years earlier, in Lochner v. New York, 6 the Court had
declared unconstitutional a New York law regulating maximum
hours of work for all bakery employees, male as well as female.
Muller did not overrule Lochner, but distinguished it on the
ground that women require special treatment which the legisla-
ture may properly require employers to supply. Here is the
relevant portion of the opinion:
That woman's physical structure and the performance of
maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for
subsistence is obvious. This is especially true when the burdens of
motherhood are upon her. Even when they are not, by abundant
testimony of the medical fraternity continuance for a long time
on her feet at work, repeating this from day to day, tends to in-
jurious effects upon the body, and as healthy mothers are essential
to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes
an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the
strength and vigor of the race.
Still again, history discloses the fact that woman has always
been dependent upon man. He established his control at the outset
by superior physical strength, and this control in various forms,
with diminishing intensity, has continued to the present. As mi-
nors, though not to the same extent, she has been looked upon in
the courts as needing especial care that her rights may be pre-
served. Education was long denied her, and while now the doors
of the school room are opened and her opportunities for acquiring
knowledge are great, yet even with that and the consequent
increase of capacity for business affairs it is still true that in the
struggle for subsistence she is not an equal competitor with her
brother. Though limitations upon personal and contractual rights
may be removed by legislation, there is that in her disposition and
habits of life which will operate against a full assertion of those
rights. She will still be where some legislation to protect her seems
necessary to secure a real equality of right. Doubtless there are
individual exceptions, and there are many respects in which she
has an advantage over him; but looking at it from the viewpoint
of the effort to maintain an independent position in life she is not
upon an equality. Differentiated by these matters from the other
sex, she is properly placed in a class by herself, and legislation
64 Murray, The Rights of Women, in The Rights of Americans 521, 525 (N.
Dorsen ed. 1971). For a much earlier statement of a similar view, see Comment,
13 B.U.L. Rev. 276 (1933).
65 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
66 198 U.S. 49 (1905).
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designed for her protection may be sustained, even when like legis-
lation is not necessary for men and could not be sustained. It is
impossible to close one's eyes to the fact that she still looks to
her brother and depends upon him. Even though all restrictions
on political, personal and contractual rights were taken away,
and she stood, so far as statutes are concerned, upon an absolutely
equal plane with him, it would still be true that she is so consti-
tuted that she will rest upon and look to him for protection; that
her physical structure and a proper discharge of her maternal
functions-having in view not merely her own health, but the
well-being of the race-justify legislation to protect her from the
greed as well as the passion of man. The limitations which this
statute places upon her contractual powers, upon her right to
agree with her employer as to the time she shall labor, are not
imposed solely for her benefit, but also largely for the benefit of
all. Many words cannot make this plainer. The two sexes differ in
structure of body, in the functions to be performed by each, in
the amount of physical strength, in the capacity for long-continued
labor, particularly when done standing, the influence of vigorous
health upon the future well-being of the race, the self-reliance
which enables one to assert full rights, and in the capacity to
maintain the struggle for subsistence. This difference justifies a
difference in legislation and upholds that which is designed to
compensate for some of the burdens which rest upon her.
67
The second quoted paragraph seems shockingly close to
Bradwell in its male supremacist assumptions. The first properly
recognizes that pregnant women are not able to perform some of
the tasks that men or nonpregnant women do. Significantly,
though, the statute applies to all women, whether pregnant or
not: Thus, the court was moved to imply that woman's primary
social function is reproduction. This idea is, of course, an integral
part of the "grand design" myth. While the Muller opinion is
slightly more restrained than Justice Bradley's concurring opinion
in Bradwell, its sexist assumptions are no different.
It now seems unfortunate that the Court did not expressly
overrule Lockner and hold that "freedom of contract" does not
inhibit states from exercising their police power to set maximum
working hours. The sexist rationale would then not have been
necessary, and the judiciary would have been deprived of one
of its most frequently cited authorities for the general proposition
that sex is a valid basis for legislative classification.0 8
67 208 U.S. at 421-23.
68 In West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), for example, the
Court upheld a minimum wage statute for women by forthrightly rejecting the
Lochner rationale and clearly establishing the principle that "freedom of contract"
is no bar to state regulation of wages and working conditions. Id. at 391-95.
While the Court did uphold a species of sex discrimination in Parrish, and in
passing quoted several of Muller's sexist statements with apparent approval, it
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The constitutional issues raised by protective legislation
have not been in the spotlight in recent years, due to the enact-
ment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits
sex-based discrimination in employment unless the employee's sex
is "a bona-fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of that particular business or enter-
prise." 60 In the wake of Muller and similar cases, several states
enacted statutes regulating employment of women in a variety
of respects.7" In addition to wage and hour standards, these in-
cluded limitations on the poundage that women could be required
to lift. Since the effect of such laws frequently is to render women
ineligible for certain jobs, their validity under Title VII was soon
questioned.7 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
has taken the position that protective regulations "have *ceased to
be relevant to our technology or the expanding role of female
workers in our economy" and should not therefore be a defense
to an otherwise unlawful employment practice.m72 Several courts
have now held that Title VII supersedes conflicting state protec-
tive laws as a matter of federal supremacy.73 The issue will very
likely make its way to the Supreme Court. To the extent that
Title VII is held to invalidate such state regulation, Miller
will have been superseded by congressional fiat.74
is possible that the Court would today be less ready to sustain such a statute against
an equal protection (as opposed to a due process) attack.
69 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1964). For
a discussion of the application of Title VII to sex discrimination, see Develop-
ments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, supra note 3, at 1166-99.
70 For a discussion of protective statutes currently in force in a number of
states, see Murray, supra note 64, at 537-39.
71 See generally Oldham, Sex Discrimination and State Protective Laws, 44
Denver L.J. 344 (1967).
72 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (b) (1971).
73 Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., No. 71-23983 (9th Cir., June 1, 1971);
Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1098 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Kober
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F. Supp. 467 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. Grabiec, 317 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Ill. 1970); Richards v. Griffith
Rubber Mills Corp., 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969); Southern Cal. Edison Co.
v. Utility Workers Local 246, 61 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 9369 (C.D. Cal. 1969);
Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, Sup. Ct. 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
See also Mengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Comm'n, 284 F. Supp. 956 (C.D.
Cal.), appeal dismissed and remanded, 393 U.S. 83 (1968). But see Krauss v.
Sacramento Inn Corp., 314 F. Supp. 171 (El.. Cal. 1970); Ward v. Luttrell, 292
F. Supp. 162 (E.D. La. 1968).
Title VII also prevails over privately imposed sex discrimination of a like
nature. See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Weeks
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969); Cheatwood v.
South Cent. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 303 F. Supp. 754 (M.D. Ala. 1969); Division of
Human Rights v. New York-Pa. Professional Baseball League, 36 App. Div. 2d
364, 320 N.Y.S.2d 788 (4th Dept. 1971).
74 If weightlifting and similar regulations are invalidated by Title VII, then
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Meanwhile, the Court has ruled on another aspect of Title
VII in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.75 In that case, the em-
ployer's policy was to refuse even to consider hiring females with
preschool children for a certain position, although no such ex-
clusion was made in the case of similarly situated males. An
unsuccessful female applicant challenged this policy, contending
that it was a per se violation of the statute. This contention was
rejected, and the case was remanded for further proceedings to
determine whether or not the policy was within the bona fide
occupational qualification exception.
Although Title VII has substituted the supremacy issue for
equal protection where state-mandated sex discrimination is con-
cerned, its ultimate effect may be to induce some judges to
rethink their position on the broader question of sex discrimina-
tion and equal protection. If it does, the reason will be the bona
fide occupational qualification exception. In Richards v. Griffith
Rubber Mills,76 for instance, an employer refused to promote a
woman because of a state regulation prohibiting women from
lifting more than fifty pounds; in the new job, she would
occasionally be required to lift as much as sixty pounds. The
court conceded that the regulation was probably valid under
Muller, but nevertheless held it invalid under Title VII, which
no longer permits either employers or the states to deal with
women as a class in relation to employment to their disadvan-
tage .... Individuals must be judged as individuals and not on
the basis of characteristics generally attributed to racial, religious,
or sexual groups.77
That "individuals must be judged as individuals" is, of course,
also the essence of the equal protection argument. The reasoning
employed in Richards to find a violation of Title VII could thus
just as easily be used to strike down, on equal protection grounds,
any state regulation that discriminates against individuals solely
on the basis of their sex.
Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. 71 also
involved an employer's refusal to consider hiring women for
certain jobs on the ground that these jobs were too "strenuous"
for females. The court not only narrowly construed the bona fide
exclusionary statutes of the sort discussed in the previous section will also fall
unless based on a "bona fide occupational qualification." Title VII does not
extend beyond employment discrimination, however. Hence, the constitutional
issues will be decisive in an area such as public accommodations, discussed in
the next section.
7r 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
76 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969).
77 Id. at 340.
78 403 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
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occupational qualification exception, but placed on the employer
the burden "of proving that he had reasonable cause to believe,
that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all
women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the
duties of the job involved."79 This test seems less stringent than
the principle stated in Richards, in that it would not necessarily
invalidate every discrimination based on attributed group char-
acteristics. On the other hand, it clearly prohibits discrimination
justifiable only by reference to characteristics attributed to an
"average" member of the affected group.8"
C. Places of Public Accommodation
Statutes and ordinances prohibiting women from patroniz-
ing bars or taverns, or regulating the manner of their patronage,
were the subject of a flurry of litigation in the early twentieth
century. These regulations, like those excluding women from
working in bars, apparently reflected a strongly held belief that
the combination of men, women and liquor in such places would
be somehow detrimental to "public morality."
In an influential 1902 Colorado case, 81 a saloon owner sought
to enjoin the enforcement of such a regulation on constitutional
grounds. A Denver ordinance, authorized by a provision of that
city's charter, prohibited keepers of "liquor saloons, dram shops,
or tippling houses" from admitting any women to their estab-
lishments, either as customers or as employees. The petitioner
had argued that a woman had the same right as a man to enter
a saloon and buy a drink of liquor, and that to forbid him to sell
liquor to women was therefore an unjustified interference with
his business and a deprivation of property without due process of
law. Granting its major premise, this argument seems compelling.
The court, however, was not at all impressed. While conceding
some validity to the petitioner's case, it nevertheless found a
reason to sustain the ordinance:
If a discrimination is made against women solely on account of
their sex, it would not be good; but if it is because of the immo-
rality that would be likely to result if the regulation was not made,
the regulation would be sustained. That injury to public morality
would ensue if women were permitted without restrictions to
frequent wine rooms, there to be supplied with liquor, is so ap-
79 Id. at 235 (emphasis added).
80 For a criticism of the Weeks decision, see Developments in the Law-
Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, supra
note 3, at 1179-81.
81 Adams v. Cronin, 29 Colo. 448, 69 P. 590 (1902), aff'd, 192 U.S. 108
(1904).
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parent to the average person that argument to establish so plain a
proposition is unnecessary. But if some people might not be willing
to concede this, it is enough to say that the general assembly,
speaking through the city council, with whom the decision entirely
rests, has so determined. Women, therefore, may properly be ex-
cluded from wine rooms, as this ordinance provides, and, if they
have no constitutional right to insist upon being admitted to places
there to be supplied with liquor, when the effect would be de-
moralizing to society, a fortiori the saloonkeeper may be prevented
from furnishing them facilities for contributing to that result....
[T]he classification made with respect to the persons permitted
to frequent wine rooms for supplying themselves there with liquor
[is] based upon reasons that have their seat in the facts of nature,
and . .. such regulations are conducive to, and are reasonably
adapted to secure, the worthy object of preserving public moral-
ity.
82
A contrary result had been reached, however, in a 1900
Kentucky case. There the ordinance not only prohibited women
from going into or out of saloons, but also made it a misdemeanor
for any woman to "frequent, loaf, or stand around" within fifty
feet of such an establishment. Penalties for violation of the
ordinance could be assessed against both the offending female
and any saloon keeper who permitted her to enter. In Gastenau
v. Commonwealth,83 a saloon keeper convicted of violating this
ordinance appealed on constitutional grounds. The prosecution
argued that the ordinance had been enacted because "very dis-
reputable, low and vile women congregate in and about saloons
and places where liquor is sold, thereby causing affrays, fights,
murder, and other crimes."8 Agreeing that regulation of the
conduct of such women was a proper subject for exercise of the
police power, the court nevertheless held the statute invalid for
overbreadth. For instance, it pointed out that lawful activities
might quite properly bring even morally upstanding women
within fifty feet of saloons. Furthermore, the court doubted
whether well-behaved females could be excluded from frequenting
saloons so long as their behavior was orderly and their purpose
was lawful. The ordinance was held to be "unreasonable and an
unnecessary interference with individual liberty." 85
Six years later, however, Kentucky courts were again pre-
sented with a challenge to the constitutionality of a similar
ordinance, which provided as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any infant or female to go into or be
82 Id. at 496-97, 69 P. at 593.
83 103 Ky. 473, 56 S.W. 705 (1900).
84 Id. at 475.
85 Id.
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in and drink intoxicating liquors in any saloon . . . or for the
keeper or proprietor or controller, or one in charge of such room
or place of business, to suffer and admit such infant or woman to
drink therein or to be or remain for over five minutes .... It shall
be a defense to this ordinance if the person charged with its viola-
tion shall show that such infant or female was of good repute
and was at the time sober and orderly and had the consent so
to do of the parent or guardian of the infant or husband of the
female, or in case of reasonable necessity.
86
A prosecution for violation of this ordinance was dismissed by
the circuit court, and the state appealed. The Court of Appeals
upheld the ordinance, distinguishing Gastenau on the ground
that the overbreadth found in that case was not repeated in this
ordinance. 7 The court was apparently convinced that the new
ordinance offered sufficient protection to orderly, well-behaved
women who visited saloons for lawful purposes, even though it
placed upon defendants the burden of proving that they were
within one of the exceptions stated in this ordinance.
Nevertheless, the ordinance was frankly sexist. It classed
women with infants, as creatures requiring man's protection. It
subjected any woman who remained in a saloon more than five
minutes to the possibility of a criminal charge, and then placed
the burden on her to justify herself-on the assumption, no
doubt, that most females in bars for over five minutes were a
threat to public morals. For married women, it required a show-
ing of spousal consent, confirming the male role as woman's
keeper or guardian.
Why should such an ordinance be enacted? Why did the
court so readily agree that, when certain women are present
together with liquor in a saloon, they "cause" men to fight and
murder? Was the ordinance designed to keep "nice" girls "nice,"
by discouraging them from going into saloons? To protect men
from their own antisocial, aggressive impulses? To make bars
into male sanctuaries? To keep the husbands of "good" women
from being tempted into liaisons with "loose" women? Whatever
the motivation for such ordinances, they achieved their aim of
regulating conduct by ascribing criminal or immoral tendencies
to citizens on the basis of their sex, rather than by requiring
a showing of actual immoral conduct.8 These ordinances reflect
two different facets of the female stereotype in the mythology
of male supremacy. On the one hand, the female is viewed as a
pure, delicate and vulnerable creature who must be protected
86 See Commonwealth v. Price, 123 Ky. 163, 164-65, 94 S.W. 32, 33 (1906)
87 Id. at 166-67, 94 S.W. at 34.
88 Cf. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971).
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from exposure to immoral influences; and on the other, as a
brazen temptress, from whose seductive blandishments the in-
nocent male must be protected. Every woman is either Eve or
Little Eva-and either way, she loses.
Similar ordinances can still be found in some municipalities.
In a 1969 case, Gallagher v. City of Bayonne,9 the ordinance
prohibited tavern owners from allowing women to stand or sit
at a bar; they could be served liquor only if seated at a table.
Despite an earlier dictum suggesting the contrary,90 the court
held that the ordinance exceeded the limits of the city's police
power. Reasoning by analogy to a recent decision invalidating
a regulation which had prevented owners from allowing homo-
sexuals to congregate at bars,"l the court concluded that the scope
of permissible regulation extended to specific antisocial or im-
moral acts, but not to the "mere congregation" of women at a
bar.
The practice of refusing service to women at bars is not
solely the result of state law. It often reflects private policies.
For instance, the Rainbow Lounge in the Hotel Syracuse had a
policy against serving unescorted women at its bar, although
apparently they could be served at tables. In DeCrow v. Hotel
Syracuse Corp.,92 a female who had been refused service sought
a federal court injunction against the continuance of this policy
on the ground that it violated the equal protection clause, the
Civil Rights Act of 196411 and a number of other federal civil
rights statutes. 4 Her action was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
on two grounds. First, it was held that the public accommodations
provisions of the 1964 Act95 (unlike Title VII) do not prohibit
sex discrimination; secondly, the equal protection clause and the
other statutes were interpreted as requiring a showing of state
action, which the court found to be absent in this case.
Plaintiff then proceeded in the state courts, contending that
defendant's policy was in violation of various provisions of the
New York Civil Rights Law. She was again unsuccessful. 6 Al-
though the state statute provides that "all persons" are entitled
S9 106 N.J. Super. 401, 256 A.2d 61 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), aff'd per
curiam, 55 N.J. 159, 259 A.2d 912 (1969).
O0 Eskridge v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages Control, 30 NJ. Super. 472,
476-77, 105 A.2d 6, 9 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1954).
01 One Eleven Wines & Liquors, Inc. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage
Control, 50 N.J. 329, 235 A.2d 12 (1967).
92 288 F. Supp. 530 (N.D.N.Y. 1968).
03 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1964).
94 Id. §§ 1983, 1985.
05 Id. §§ 2000a-2000a-6.
08 De Crow v. Hotel Syracuse Corp., 99 Misc. 2d 383, 298 N.Y.S.2d 859
(Sup. Ct. 1969).
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to full and equal facilities and privileges in places of public
accommodation, it only prohibits owners from denying equality
"on account of race, creed, color or national origin. 9 7 The court
held that sex discrimination was not a violation of the latter
provision. Another section of the statute declares it to be a mis-
demeanor for any innkeeper to refuse "without just cause or
excuse, to receive and entertain any guest."98 This provision was
not violated, said the court, because the defendant did not refuse
to serve the plaintiff; service was merely conditioned on the fe-
male's having an escort or being willing to sit at a table.
The first line of reasoning may be defensible on the ground
that sex discrimination was not specifically prohibited by the
statute; it is nevertheless a narrow construction in the light of
the statute's purpose and the declaration that all persons are
entitled to equal service. The second rationale, however, is inde-
fensible: The attempt to characterize the effect of the hotel's
policy as conditional service, rather than as a refusal to serve, is
an exercise in sophistry. Suppose persons of a certain race were
prohibited from sitting in certain sections of restaurants, or from
living in certain areas of a city or riding in certain parts of a bus.
Would anyone seriously contend that this is "conditional accep-
tance" of, rather than refusal to accept, members of that race?
The hotel's policy should have been recognized for what it
was-a refusal to serve unescorted women under circumstances
where unescorted men would receive service. The fact that
unescorted women (and men) could sit at tables or that escorted
women (or men) could sit at the bar is therefore simply irrele-
vant. In terms of the statute, then, the only real question is
whether or not this refusal of service was for "just cause or
excuse." It was incumbent upon the court to inquire as to the
reasons for the defendant's policy and then to test them against
the statute's purpose of guaranteeing freedom from discrimina-
tion in places of public accommodation. By resorting to the
specious "conditional service" rationale, the court abdicated this
responsibility.
Private discrimination was again challenged on federal
constitutional grounds in Seidenberg v. McSorley's Old Ale House,
Inc.9 The facts were similar to the DeCrow cases, except that
no female had ever been served at the defendant's establishment,
at the bar or elsewhere. Declining to follow the first DeCrow
97 N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 40 (McKinney 1948).
98 Id. § 40-e (McKinney Supp. 1970).
99 317 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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decision, however, the district court denied a motion to dismiss
the action for want of jurisdiction. 00 There being no issue as to
any material fact, both parties moved for summary judgment,
and the plaintiff's motion was granted.
In order to reach the constitutional issue, the court first had
to find that the defendant's exclusionary policy constituted state
action. It conceded that the Supreme Court has never ruled that
a private commercial enterprise is subject to the fourteenth
amendment solely because it is licensed by the state. The court
nevertheless held that the compelling public interest in the
liquor trade, coupled with New York's pervasive regulatory
scheme, justified the requirement that the defendant conduct its
business on the same principle of equality applicable to the state
itself.
Having reached the equal protection issue, the court pro-
ceeded to test defendant's policy against the rational basis
standard:
In the case before us no difference between men and women,
as potential customers of the defendant, has been offered as a
rational basis for serving the one and not the other. It may be
argued that the occasional preference of men for a haven to which
they may retreat from the watchful eye of wives or womanhood
in general to have a drink or pass a few hours in their own com-
pany, is justification enough; that the simple fact that women
are not men justifies defendant's practice. The answer is that
McSorleys' is a public place, not a private club, and that the
preferences of certain of its patrons are no justification under the
Equal Protection Clause. Such preferences, no matter how widely
shared by defendant's male clientele, bear no rational relation to
the suitability of women as customers of McSorleys'.
Nor do we find any merit in the argument that the presence
of women in bars gives rise to "moral and social problems" against
which McSorleys' can reasonably protect itself by excluding wo-
men from the premises.... Outdated images of bars as dens of
coarseness and iniquity and of women as peculiarly delicate and
impressionable creatures in need of protection from the rough and
tumble of unvarnished humanity will no longer justify sexual
separatism.' 0
In Seidenberg, as in Gallagher, a court has finally repudiated
the notion that every woman should be viewed as either an in-
nocent or a temptress-and in either case, as somehow man's
inferior-to be guarded or guarded against. Once this attitude
has been overcome, there is no further justification for discrimina-
100 Seidenberg v. McSorley's Old Ale House, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1253
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
101 317 F. Supp. at 605-06.
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tion against female patrons in bars. These two opinions have
established a new model for judicial review of discriminatory ordi-
nances and policies applicable to places of public accommodation.
Their influence need not be confined to this area of law,
however. Many kinds of sex discrimination are rationalized, even
today, on the basis of stereotypes just as simplistic and exag-
gerated as those reflected in the liquor cases. As other courts are
persuaded to follow the example set in Sail'er Inn, Seidenberg and
Gallagher, they will be obliged to make a more searching inquiry
into the rationality of any sex classification challenged on equal
protection grounds. They will no longer be content to uphold
discriminatory laws merely as a gesture of total deference to the
legislature or as a shield against some ill-defined threat to public
morality. Even more importantly, they will reexamine their own
uncritical acceptance of stereotypical ideas about sex character-
istics as appropriate grounds for legislative distinctions.
D. Jury Qualification
The common law jury, grand and petit, was exclusively a
male institution. °2 The right (or duty) of women to serve as
jurors was not recognized in America until the early twentieth
century, when women began to obtain voting rights. 1 3 There is,
however, one series of nineteenth-century opinions from the
Washington Territory which vividly suggests how one male
judge viewed the desirability of permitting women to serve on
juries.
A Washington statute provided that all "qualified electors"
were eligible to serve as petit jurors and all "qualified electors
and householders" were eligible to serve as grand jurors. In
Rosencrantz v. Territory,1°4 a female defendant had been in-
dicted by a grand jury composed in part of married women
living with their husbands. She appealed, claiming that her
indictment had been returned by an improperly constituted grand
jury. The Supreme Court of the Territory denied her appeal,
noting that the franchise had been extended to Washington
women by statute and that the female jurors were thus "qualified
electors." But the court construed the statute as requiring grand
jurors to be both "qualified electors" and "householders."
Whether a married woman living with her husband could be a
"householder" was thus the determinative issue. The court con-
102 The sole exception was a jury of females called to determine the fact
of pregnancy. 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *362 (1775).
103 See generally Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 289-90 (1947).
104 2 Wash. Terr. 267, 5 P. 305 (1884).
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cluded that the local Married Women's Act conferred sufficient
joint control over the family property and children so that both
husband and wife could be deemed "householders" within the
meaning of the jury statute. The majority opinion did not discuss
the desirability of having women on juries; it did, however,
suggest that the principle of equality expressed in the Married
Women's Act constituted a "spirit of progress."'10 5
The decision evoked a furious dissent from Judge Turner.
He contended that, in light of the jury's history as an institution,
"qualified electors" was meant to refer exclusively to qualified
male electors; in any event, he argued, married women were not
"householders." In elaborating the first of these two arguments,
he revealed a strong opinion on the underlying question of policy:
It is said that the rights of the weaker sex, if I may now call them
so, are more regarded than in the days of Blackstone, and that the
theory of that day, that women were unfitted by physical con-
stitution and mental characteristics to assume and perform the
civil and political duties and obligations of citizenship, has been
exploded by the advanced ideas of the nineteenth century. This
may be true. No man honors the sex more than I. None has wit-
nessed more cheerfully the improvement in the laws of the states,
and particularly in the laws of this territory, whereby many of
the disabilities of that day are removed from them, and their
just personal and property rights put upon an equal footing with
with those of men. I cannot say, however, that I wish to see them
perform the duties of jurors. The liability to perform jury duty is
an obligation, not a right. In the case of woman, it is not necessary
that she should accept the obligation to secure or maintain her
rights. If it were, I should stifle all expression of the repugnance
that I feel at seeing her introduced into associations, and exposed
to influences which, however others regard it, must, in my opinion,
shock and blunt those fine sensibilities, the possession of which is
her chiefest charm [sic], and the protection of which, under the
religion and laws of all countries, civilized or semi-civilized, is
her most sacred right.
If one woman is competent as a juror, all women having the
same qualifications are competent. If women may try one case,
they may try all cases. It is unnecessary to say more; to suggest
the shocking possibilities to which our wives, mothers, sisters,
and daughters may be exposed, unless the legislature should here-
after relieve us from what I believe to be a mistaken construction
of the law. These observations, however, are not pertinent here.
The question is, what is the law? I say that the law now concern-
ing the important incidents of a jury trial are, by express con-
stitutional provision, what they were at the common law, and
that under that law a jury was no jury unless it was composed
of men. 0 6
105 Id. at 274, 5 P. at 305.
100 Id. at 278-79, S P. at 309-10.
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Judge Turner had an equally strong view on the question of
whether a married woman living with her husband could be a
"householder" within the meaning of the statute:
The husband was not only the head of the family at common law,
because under that law he had the right to be obeyed by all the
family, including the wife, but because of inherent and acquired
differences between himself and wife in mental and physical con-
stitution. He was better fitted to wage the war for present sub-
sistence, and to accumulate the competence that was to make
provision against want in the future. The experience gained by
him in prosecuting this branch of the partnership matured his
judgment, strengthened his will, and made him confident and self-
reliant. I believe that the facts I have mentioned obtain to this
day, and that they operate and will continue to operate to give
the husband paramount authority in the household, as that term
is understood at common law, until an upheaval of nature has
reversed the position of man and woman in the world. Legislative
enactment would not make white black, nor can it provide the
female form with bone and sinew equal in strength to that with
which nature has provided man. No more can it reverse the law
of cause and effect, and clothe a timid, shrinking woman, whose
life theater is and will continue to be and ought to continue to
be, primarily the home circle, with the masculine will and self-
reliant judgment of a man.
0 7
Three years later, in Harland v. Territory,"8 the same court
was faced with the same issue of jury service by women. Perhaps
in part due to personnel changes on the court, a majority of the
judges joined in Judge Turner's opinion overruling Rosen-
crantz. o9
Female eligibility for jury service was not widely litigated
until the years immediately following World War I, when, as a
result of the nationwide women's suffrage movement, the nine-
teenth amendment was adopted. Since jury qualification in many
states was linked in some respect to voting eligibility, the exten-
sion of suffrage to women frequently raised-as it had in the
Washington Territory cases-the question of whether women
were thereby qualified to serve on juries.""
107 Id. at 281, 5 P. at 311.
IOS 3 Wash. Terr. 131, 13 P. 453 (1887).
109 The ground chosen was a narrowly technical one, but the result was
sweeping: For failure to properly express its "object" in its title, the statute
conferring voting rights on women in Washington Territory was held to be
invalid. The result was to render women not only ineligible for jury service, but
also ineligible to vote. In 1888, the Washington Legislature acted again to confer
suffrage on women, but the statute was again struck down, this time as being
outside the power of the territorial legislature. Bloomer v. Todd, 3 Wash. Terr.
599, 19 P. 135 (1888).
110 Of course, the nineteenth amendment took precedence over any contrary
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Where the statute defined eligibility for jury service in
terms of "qualified electors" or some similar phrase, many state
courts held that the extension of suffrage to women automatically
made them eligible to serve as jurors."' In other states with
similar statutes, the opposite result was reached; a notable ex-
ample is Commonwealth v. Welosky.
112
In Welosky, the defendant challenged the array of jurors on
the ground that women had been excluded. The applicable
Massachusetts statute provided that every "person qualified to
vote" for the legislature should be eligible for jury service.'13
Despite the extension of suffrage to female citizens of Massa-
chusetts, the court held that the legislature had not intended the
reference in the statute to a "person qualified to vote" to include
females:
It is unthinkable that those who first framed and selected the
words for the statute now embodied in G.L.c. 234, § 1, had any
design that it should ever include women within its scope. It is
equally inconceivable that those who from time to time had re-
enacted that statute had any such design. When they used the
word "person" in connection with those qualified to vote for
members of the more numerous branch of the General Court, to
describe those liable to jury service, no one contemplated the
possibility of women becoming so qualified. The same is true in
general of those who from time to time re-enacted the statute in
substantially the same words. No intention to include women can
be deduced from the omission of the word male. That word was
imbedded in the Constitution of the Commonwealth as a limita-
tion upon those citizens who might become voters and thereby
provision of state law; if it had provided that jury qualifications should be
equal for both sexes, no state law to the contrary would have prevailed. The
amendment was universally held, however, to be directed solely at suffrage. E.g.,
State v. Mittle, 120 S.C. 526, 113 S.E. 335, writ of error dismissed for want of
jurisdiction, 260 U.S. 705, cert. denied, 260 U.S. 744 (1922).
111 E.g., People v. Barltz, 212 Mich. 580, 180 N.W. 423 (1920); Parus v.
District Court, 42 Nev. 229, 174 P. 706 (1918). For a collection of cases, see
Annot., 157 A.L.R. 461, 470 (1945).
112 276 Mass. 398, 177 N.E. 656 (1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 684 (1932).
Another example is People ex rel. Fyfe v. Barnett, 319 Ill. 403, 150 N.E. 290
(1925). But see People ex reL Denny v. Traeger, 372 Ill. 11, 22 N.E.2d 679
(1939).
113 Ten years earlier, the Supreme judicial Court of Massachusetts had been
asked by the state's House of Representatives whether, in light of the ratification
of the nineteenth amendment, women were automatically qualified as jurors, and,
if not, whether the legislature bad the power to declare them qualified. The court
answered these questions in the negative and affirmative, respectively. In re
Opinion of the Justices, 237 Mass. 591, 130 N.E. 685 (1921). The jury statute
under consideration in Welosky was the statute which had been considered in
the court's earlier opinion; because of its advisory nature, however, the earlier
opinion was expressly treated in Welosky as nonbinding (although, as the text
indicates, it was not repudidted). 276 Mass. at 400, 177 N.E. at 658 (1931).
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members of a class from which jurors might be drawn. It would
have been superfluous also to insert that word in the statute.114
The court's conclusion as to legislative intent was bolstered by
two other points, both of which have become familiar themes:
a felt necessity to exempt at least some women from jury service,
and the lack of suitable accommodations for women jurors." 5
As in Welosky, most state courts treated the eligibility issue
as one of statutory construction.' In North Carolina, however,
a constitutional issue was determinative. In State v. Emery11 7 it
was held that the state constitution, which provided for the
"ancient mode of trial by jury" and for conviction only by "a
jury of good and lawful men," precluded the extension of jury
service to females. The majority rested its holding entirely upon
the unchallenged fact that trial by jury at the common law con-
sisted of trial by male jurors. One dissenting justice commented on
this at length:
[I] think the language of the Constitution should not be held to
a rigid and inelastic construction when it conflicts with the pro-
gress of human thought and changing social conditions. It should
be more liberally construed so as to meet the needs of a complex
and growing civilization. I think this section of the Constitution
is capable of the reasonable interpretation, in accord with modern
thought, which would not disqualify women from this important
service. I think it should be given this interpretation in the light
of the progressive changes in the status of women and their equal
share with men in the powers and responsibilities of government
and justice. I do not think the courts should be restricted to the
mere ascertainment of what we think now was in the minds of
the framers of the Constitution who, however wisely they laid the
foundations, could not envision the limitless future, else we should
be fettered by the dead hand of the past." 8
The other dissenter, however, delivered the coup de grace to
the majority with a more laconic observation: "The most insis-
tent argument advanced in behalf of appellants is that women have
114 276 Mass. at 407-08, 177 N.E. at 661.
115 Id. at 410-11, 177 N.E. at 662. As examples of cases where these two
factors were given weight, see People v. Shannon, 203 Cal. 139, 141-42, 263 P.
522, 523 (1928); State v. Kelley, 39 Idaho 668, 676, 229 P. 659, 662 (1924).
116 Cases which found no constitutional obstacle to the addition of women
to juries include: People ex rel. Denny v. Traeger, 372 Ill. 11, 22 N.E.2d 679
(1939), and Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 271 Pa. 378, 114 A. 825 (1921). See also
United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145 (1936), where there is dictum to the
effect that the jury trial provision of the sixth amendment is no bar to the
addition of women to the jury.
117 224 N.C. 581, 31 S.E.2d 858 (1944).
118 Id. at 591, 31 S.E.2d at 865 (Devin, J., dissenting).
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never been permitted to serve on juries. Which goes to show that
an attitude can be more formidable than an argument."' n9
As the eligibility of women for jury service came to be
more widely recognized and the presence of females on juries
became commonplace, two new questions were raised: Can a
state properly exclude all women from jury service? Alternatively,
can a state permit all prospective women jurors voluntarily to
exempt themselves from service?
The United States Supreme Court has never directly ruled
on the first question, but Strauder v. West Virginia"20 contains a
frequently quoted dictum on the subject. The issue in Strauder
was whether a Negro could lawfully be tried under a statute
limiting jury service to white male citizens. Holding the statute's
racial classification to be in violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Court added:
We do not say that within the limits from which it is not
excluded by the amendment a State may not prescribe the quali-
fications of its jurors, and in so doing make discriminations. It
may confine the selection to males, to freeholders, to citizens, to
persons within certain ages, or to persons having educational qual-
ifications. We do not believe the Fourteenth Amendment was ever
intended to prohibit this. Looking at its history, it is clear it had
no such purpose. Its aim was against discrimination because of
race or color. As we have said more than once, its design was to
protect an emancipated race, and to strike down all possible legal
discriminations against those who belong to it.... We are not now
called upon to affirm or deny that it had other purposes.
121
Since Strauder, the Court has decided three cases involving
the exclusion of women from juries. In none of these, however,
was the exclusion prescribed by state law. Two involved federal
juries chosen at a time when the federal statute referred to state
law for standards of jury eligibility. In Ballard v. United States
the Court indicated that exclusion of females from the federal
jury had been improper, since the state law involved there ex-
pressly qualified women for service.122 Speaking for four of the
119 Id. at 601, 31 S.E.2d at 871-72 (Seawell, J., dissenting). Another way to
deal with the historical argument is to meet it on its own ground. In Common-
wealth v. Maxwell, 271 Pa. 378, 114 A. 825 (1921), the court held that historically
the most important feature of trial by jury had been that the legislature had the
power to set jury qualifications.
120 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
121 Id. at 310.
122 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946). In the earlier case, Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60 (1942), the Court had refused to find that an all-male federal grand
jury had been improperly constituted. This holding, however, was based on the
fact that only a very short period of time had elapsed between the enactment
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
October 19711
HeinOnline -- 46 N.Y.U. L. Rev.  713 1971
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
five-man majority, Mr. Justice Douglas eloquently stated a case
for inclusion of women on juries:
It is said, however, that an all male panel drawn from the
various groups within a community will be as truly representative
as if women were included. The thought is that the factors which
tend to influence the action of women are the same as those which
influence the action of men-personality, background, economic
status-and not sex. Yet it is not enough to say that women when
sitting as jurors neither act nor tend to act as a class. Men likewise
do not act as a class. But, if the shoe were on the other foot, who
would claim that a jury was truly representative of the community
if all men were intentionally and systematically excluded from the
panel? The truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a com-
munity made up exclusively of one is different from a community
composed of both; the subtle interplay of influence one on the
other is among the imponderables. To insulate the courtroom from
either may not in a given case make an iota of difference. Yet a
flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded. The ex-
clusion of one may indeed make the jury less representative of
the community than would be true if an economic or racial group
were excluded.1
2 3
The third case, Fay v. New York, 12 4 involved a number of
challenges to a New York "blue ribbon" grand jury, one of which
alleged systematic discrimination against women in selecting the
venire.12 5 The Court affirmed the lower court's conclusion that
appellant's evidence did not establish this contention, but went on
to suggest that the exclusion of women from juries would not
raise a serious constitutional question:
The first state to permit women jurors was Washington, and it
did not do so until 1911. In 1942 only 28 states permitted women
to serve on juries and they were still disqualified in the other 20.
Moreover, in 15 of the 28 states which permitted women to serve,
of the Illinois statute qualifying women for jury service and the selection of the
grand jury in question. Id. at 64-65. The Court's clear implication was that
absent these circumstances, the exclusion of women from the jury list would have
been error.
123 329 U.S. at 193-94 (1946).
124 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
125 The defendants in Fay were male labor union officials who had been
convicted of extorting payments from employers by threats of various kinds. Their
principal ground of appeal was the asserted invalidity of the process by which the
special "blue ribbon" jury panel was drawn, alleging that the process discriminated
both against women and against laborers, craftsmen and service employees-the
"working class" in general. The five-member majority's opinion appears to hold
that the record on appeal justified a finding of no purposeful discrimination; it
also declares that such discrimination, even if present, would not necessarily
constitute a denial of equal protection to defendants. Mr. Justice Murphy's dis-
senting opinion does not touch on the issue of sex discrimination, and, in light
of the nature of the defendants' activities, it seems likely that the allegations of
economic and social discrimination were the main basis of defendants' argument.
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they might claim exemption because of their sex. It would, in the
light of this history, take something more than a judicial interpre-
tation to spell out of the Constitution a command to set aside
verdicts rendered by juries unleavened by feminine influence.
The contention that women should be on the jury is not based on
the Constitution, it is based on a changing view of the rights and
responsibilities of women in our public life, which has progressed
in all phases of life, including jury duty, but has achieved con-
stitutional compulsion on the states only in the grant of the fran-
chise by the Nineteenth Amendment. We may insist on their
inclusion on federal juries where by state law they are eligible
but woman jury service has not so become a part of the textual
or customary law of the land that one convicted of crime must
be set free by this Court if his state has lagged behind what we
personally may regard as the most desirable practice in recognizing
the rights and obligations of womanhood.'
2 6
Although understandable in its reluctance to impose federal con-
stitutional standards in an area historically within the states'
competence to control, this dictum nevertheless calls to mind-in
its total reliance on historical practice as justification for sex
discrimination-the dissenter's observation in State v. Emery
that attitudes can be more formidable than arguments.
A 1939 Florida opinion is also worthy of note on the
exclusion issue. In Hall v. State,127 a statute restricting jury
service to males was challenged by a female defendant. Relying
on the Strauder dictum, the court rejected her contention that
the statute violated the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.
The court further concluded that the exclusion of women from
the jury could not have prejudiced the defendant:
It is not contended that juries composed of men would be less
fair to women defendants than would juries composed of women.
Indeed, experience would lead to a contrary conclusion. The spirit
of chivalry and of deep respect for the rights of the opposite sex,
have not yet departed from the heads and hearts of the men of
this country.
128
The court's facile assumption may be questioned in light of the
fact that the defendant in this case was accused of having given
perjured testimony against a male defendant in an earlier murder
trial. She was convicted by the all-male jury and sentenced to
life imprisonment. 29
120 332 U.S. at 289-90.
127 136 Fla. 644, 187 So. 392 (1939).
128 Id. at 665, 187 So. at 401.
129 The court's rationale is also called into question by the many cases
throughout the country which have considered whether a particular defendant
has standing to raise the issue of exclusion of women from the jury lists. A rule
applied in many state courts, although apparently not favored in the federal
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The first square holding that exclusion of women from juries
violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
was White v. Crook,130 a case involving the Alabama jury statute.
Ignoring the Strauder dictum, the court expressed its conclusion
as follows:
Women are allowed to serve on juries in the federal courts
and in the courts of forty-seven states. Only in three-Alabama,
Mfississippi and South Carolina-are women completely excluded
from jury service. The time must come when a state's complete
exclusion of women from jury service is recognized as so arbitrary
and unreasonable as to be unconstitutional. As to Alabama, we
can see no reason for not recognizing that fact at the present
time.18'
Without questioning the soundness of the result, we might point
out that the opinion relies on nose-counting as its means of
determining the scope of fourteenth amendment guarantees; in
this respect, it is open to the same criticism as Fay v. New York.
The State of Alabama did not appeal from the White decision,
and all three statutes completely excluding women from jury
service have since been repealed." 2 Subsequent to White, and
prior to its repeal, however, the Mississippi statute was upheld
by the supreme court of that state. 3 The following paragraph
is the only portion of the opinion in which any reason was ad-
vanced to justify exclusion:
The legislature has the right to exclude women so they may
continue their service as mothers, wives, and homemakers, and
also to protect them (in some areas, they are still upon a ped-
estal) from the filth, obscenity, and noxious atmosphere that so
often pervades a courtroom during a jury trial.
13 4
With the demise of exclusionary state statutes, the issue
raised in White might appear to be moot. Cases may well arise,
courts, is that only a female defendant has standing to raise the issue, on the
theory that it is the female defendant whose interests are threatened by
practices which operate to exclude women. For cases applying the majority rule,
see, e.g., Griffin v. State, 183 Ga. 775, 190 S.E. 2 (1937); McKinney v. State, 3
Wyo. 719, 30 P. 293 (1892). Contra, Walter v. State, 208 Ind. 231, 195 N.E. 268
(1935). As to the federal courts, compare United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564,
567 n.2 (1st Cir. 1970), with Woodruff v. Breazeale, 291 F. Supp. 130 (W.D.
Miss. 1967), aff'd, 401 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1968).
130 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (3-judge court).
131 Id. at 409.
132 Ala. Code tit. 30, § 21 (Supp. 1969), amending Ala. Code tit. 30, § 21
(1958); Miss. Code Ann. § 1762 (Supp. 1970), amending Miss. Code Ann.
§ 1762 (1942); S.C. Code Ann. § 38-52 (Supp. 1970), amending S.C. Code Ann.
§ 38-52 (1962).
3.3 State v. Hall, 187 So. 2d 861 (Miss.), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 98
(1966). See also Philpot v. State, 43 Ala. App. 326, 190 So. 2d 293 (1966).
134 State v. Hall, 187 So. 2d 861, 863 (Miss. 1966).
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however, in which relief is sought from various other exclusionary
practices. For example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has
recently ruled that, in light of Mississippi's new statute making
women eligible for jury service, state officials have a duty not to
discriminate by including only a token proportion of women on
the jury list.135
Now that statutory exclusion of females from juries is at
least out of fashion, if not unconstitutional, primary attention
is shifting from exclusion to exemption. Statutes in a number of
jurisdictions permit women, though eligible for service, to exempt
themselves solely on account of their sex. Such statutes have been
consistently upheld against the claim that they unconstitutionally
discriminate against female defendants 36 or against prospective
male jurors.137
Some exemption statutes give every female summoned for
jury duty the privilege of excusing herself from service. In a few
states, the statutes have gone even further, providing that no
woman is to be placed on the jury list unless she has previously
filed a statement of her willingness to be called for service. The
rationale for the latter type of statute is that it avoids the
inefficiency of summoning many women who would choose to
claim their exemption if called.
In Hoyt v. Florida,'138 a statute of this latter type was up-
held by the Supreme Court against an equal protection attack.
Noting that eighteen states permitted an automatic exemption
for women and that three of these implemented this policy by
calling only those women who had previously volunteered, the
Court found that there was a rational basis for Florida's system:
Despite the enlightened emancipation of women from the restric-
tions and protections of bygone years, and their entry into many
parts of community life formerly considered to be reserved to
men, woman is still regarded as the center of home and family
life. We cannot say that it is constitutionally impermissible for a
State, acting in pursuit of the general welfare, to conclude that
135 Ford v. White, 430 F.2d 951, 955 (5th Cir. 1970). See also United States
v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970), holding that inclusion of a disproportion-
ately small number of women on the master jury list raises an inference of
purposeful discrimination. Occasionally, the intentional exclusion of women jurors
from a particular case will be frankly admitted. E.g., Abbott v. mines, 411 F.2d
33 (6th Cir. 1969) (trial judge had barred all women from jury empaneled to
try malpractice action involving cancer of the penis); State ex rel. Passer v.
County Ed., 171 Minn. 177, 213 N.W. 545 (1927) (trial court had excluded females
from panel when a number of "carnal knowledge" cases were pending).
136 E.g., State v. Bray, 153 La. 103, 95 So. 417 (1923).
137 E.g., Leighton v. Goodman, 311 F. Supp. 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
138 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
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a woman should be relieved from the civic duty of jury service
unless she herself determines that such service is consistent with
her own special responsibilities.3 9
The appellant also contended that Florida's statute, as
applied, was unconstitutionally discriminatory. She pointed out
that, out of some 46,000 eligible women voters in her county,
only 220 had volunteered for jury duty during the eight years
women had been eligible for such service. "Beside the point," the
Court responded; " [g] iven the reasonableness of the classification
. . the relative paucity of women jurors does not carry" any
"constitutional consequence."' 4 Given the fact-accepted by the
Court-that the end product of the Florida system in defendant's
county was a jury list of 10,000 persons, of which only ten-tenl
-were women, it is apparent that the Florida system was the
functional equivalent of total exclusion. 41
As indicated above, the Court has never held that outright
exclusion of women from juries is a violation of equal protection.
For many years, however, the Court has consistently condemned
racial exclusion in jury selection.14 2 The Hoyt opinion attempted
to explain this seeming anomaly:
This case in no way resembles those involving race or color
in which the circumstances shown were found by this Court to
compel a conclusion of purposeful discriminatory exclusions from
jury service .... There is present here neither the unfortunate at-
mosphere of ethnic or racial prejudices which underlay the situa-
tions depicted in those cases, nor the long course of discriminatory
administrative practice which the statistical showing in each of
them evinced.1
43
The meaning of this passage is obscure. At best, it overlooks the
obvious fact that statutes exempting women from jury service
do reflect the historical male prejudice against female participa-
tion in activities outside the family circle. At worst, it can be read
as condoning that prejudice by suggesting that, although racial
and ethnic prejudice are "unfortunate," sex prejudice is not.
139 Id. at 61-62.
140 Id. at 65.
141 The idea that exclusion is the natural result of the women-volunteers-only
type of exemption statute is also strongly suggested by the Louisiana cases. See
State v. Reese, 250 La. 151,' 171, 194 So. 2d 729, 737, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 996
(1967);, State v. Dreher, 166 La. 924, 943, 118 So. 85, 92, cert. denied, 278 U.S.
641 (1928); State v. Bray, 153 La. 103, 106, 95 So. 417, 418 (1923). In each
of these cases involving a female defendant there were apparently no women on
the jury panel in the defendant's parish.
142 E.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). See generally, Swain
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 204, 228-29 (1965).
143 368 U.S. at 68.
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Notwithstanding Hoyt's susceptibility to such criticism, any
judge thereafter facing a federal constitutional challenge to a
similar exemption for women could simply cite that case as dis-
positive.14 4 In two recent cases involving the New York jury
statute, however, judges have seen fit to add further embellishment
to the Hoyt rationale, thereby reflecting their own attitudes
toward this type of sex discrimination.
In Leighton v. Goodman,141 a male called for jury duty sought
an injunction against the county clerk's enforcement of the
summons. Plaintiff challenged the jury statute on equal protec-
tion grounds: that by providing automatic exemption for women
-all women-it in effect discriminated against all males. Al-
though acknowledging that "the time may very well be ripe" for
the legislature to amend the statute, the district court neverthe-
less held the constitutional claim "patently insufficient as a
matter of law." Adhering to the "rational basis" test, the court
suggested a justification for the exemption:
Granted that some women pursue business careers, the great ma-
jority constitute the heart of the home, where they are busily
engaged in the 24-hour task of producing and rearing children,
providing a home for the entire family, and performing the daily
household work, all of which demands their full energies. Although
some women now question this arrangement, the state legislature
has permitted the exemption in order not to risk disruption of
the basic family unit. Its action was far from arbitrary. 46
Even if the court's factual assumptions were correct,147 the view
of women here expressed is reminiscent of that expressed by
Judge Turner nearly ninety years ago.
In DeKosenko v. Brandt,14 plaintiff, a female tenant suing
her landlord, also challenged the New York jury law on con-
stitutional grounds, claiming that it would deprive her of a fair
144 Before the Florida statute was amended in 1967, it was once more un-
successfully challenged, this time on the ground that it operated unfairly to
exclude black women from juries. Scott v. State, 207 So. 2d 493 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 884 (1968).
145 311 F. Supp. 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
146 Id. at 1183.
147 In 1965, 37% of all women of working age were in the labor force.
Nearly 60% of these women were married, and over a third had children under
18 years of age. In families where all children were over six years old and the
fathers were at home and working, 43% of the wives were employed. U.S.
Dep't of Labor, Women's Bureau Bull. No. 240, 1969 Handbook on Women
Workers 19, 21, 37, 42 (1965). Whether these figures show that the "great majority"
of women spend a 24-hour day at home is debatable. They certainly do not support
the proposition that the working woman represents an aberration, which seems to
be the court's view.
148 63 Misc. 2d 895, 313 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
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jury. Her claim was denied by the New York County Supreme
Court in an opinion defective in so many different ways that no
description here could possibly do it justice. As an inducement
to the reader to see for himself, we present the final passage:
Plaintiff is in the wrong forum. Her lament should be ad-
dressed to the "Nineteenth Amendment State of Womanhood"
which prefers cleaning and cooking, rearing of children and tele-
vision soap operas, bridge and canasta, the beauty parlor and
shopping, to becoming embroiled in plaintiff's problems with her
landlord. 149
We offer the following translation: "Plaintiff cannot complain
of the absence of women on her jury, because that results from
the willingness of women to claim their exemption, not from the
mere existence of the exemption itself." As the dissenting Florida
judge in Hoyt remarked in his opinion:
[I]t seems to me that if the present restriction upon female
jury service were constitutional, then we must hold that the legis-
lature could validly require all women to serve but limit male
service to volunteers and thus, in effect, create an all female jury
system.1
50
In such a situation, would an absence of males from the jury
thereafter be ascribed to "the State of Manhood, which prefers
golf, bowling and working for a living to becoming embroiled in
another male's lawsuit"?
Despite the general judicial acquiescence, we submit that
an automatic jury exemption for women should raise a serious
equal protection question. We doubt that any statute would today
be upheld which provided that all black persons (or, for that
matter, all white persons) should have an automatic exemption
from jury service.'' Is a blanket exemption for all females any
more justifiable? Granted that many females have work or child
-49 Id. at 898, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 830. The DeKosenko opinion was written by
a judge who had earlier exhibited insensitivity to the aspirations of women. See
Goldblatt v. Board of Educ., 52 Misc. 2d 238, 275 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Civ. Ct. 1966),
aff'd, 57 Misc. 2d 1089, 294 N.Y.S.2d 272 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (holding a female
teacher not entitled to benefit of differential salary payment during her period of
jury service, though male teacher would be so entitled).
15o Hoyt v. State, 119 So. 2d 691, 701-02 (Fla. 1960) (Hobson, J.), aff'd,
368 U.S. 57 (1961).
151 A Florida Supreme Court judge who dissented in the Hoyt case raised
this point:
No one in this enlightened age would question the fact that if a
limitation such as is placed upon women by our statute with reference to
jury service were engrafted into our statutory law in regard to some of
the so-called minority groups comprising our citizenry, it would be
stricken down as violative of constitutional guarantees of due process
and equal protection of the laws.
Id. at 700.
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care responsibilities (or health disabilities) which might justify
excusing them from service, it is difficult to imagine any excuse
(except pregnancy, a condition hardly shared at any one time by
even a majority of the women in America) which could not also
be advanced by a man similarly situated. 52 How then is it
possible to maintain that an exemption for every woman-
including even the childless, single woman, and the working wife
or mother-is not an arbitrary discrimination when based solely
on her sex? Such a scheme, we submit, is based-and court
opinions right up to the present day support our contention--on
an additional assumption: that women are delicate creatures to
be encouraged to stay at home and be protected from the hard,
cruel world-and incidentally, as long as they are at home, to do
the cooking, cleaning, mending and ironing for those of us who
do have the affairs of the world to attend to.
E. Public Education
Although the dominant form of public education in the
United States today is obviously "coeducation" (both sexes
taught in the same schools and usually in the same classes), a
number of public institutions of higher learning are not coedu-
cational. In recent years a few courts have been called upon to
decide the validity of a state educational policy providing for
separation of the sexes; overall, the results represent at best a
limited recognition of the right to equal educational opportunity
regardless of sex.
Two such cases have come before the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals. In 1958, in Hleaton v. Bristol,r3 female plaintiffs had
sought to enter Texas A. & M., an all-male institution. Reversing
the lower court, the appellate court held--despite uncontroverted
findings by the trial court that Texas A. & M. offered several
courses of study not available at any other public institution of
higher learning in the state-that no constitutional right of the
plaintiffs had been violated. First, it was not shown that plain-
tiffs desired to take any of the courses unique to that institution.
Nor was the court impressed by plaintiffs' argument that, by
162 There seems to be no reason why a jury statute could not simply provide
an exemption for any individual (regardless of sex) having the personal re-
sponsibility of caring for a minor child. While most of the prospective jurors thus
excused might still be women, the exemption would then be related to a relevant
circumstance affecting particular individuals, and men coming within its provisions
would be entitled to a similar exemption. Such a statute was upheld against con-
stitutional challenge in State v. Smith, 102 N.J. Super. 325, 246 A.2d 39 (Super.
Ct. 1968), aff'd, 55 N.J. 476, 262 A.2d 868, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970).
2G3 317 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 230 (1959).
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denying them the right to attend this particular institution,
which was most near their homes and thus most convenient, the
state had denied them equal protection. Finally, the court relied
upon the existence of compulsory military training at Texas
A. & M. as evidence of its unsuitability for females and pointed
to the lack of any precedent upholding plaintiffs' position.
To determine whether there is unequal treatment of the
sexes, the court stated, one must view the state's entire higher
education system. The court concluded that the Texas system
did make "ample and substantially equal provision for the edu-
cation of both sexes." 1" In the court's view, the question was
simply whether the state may constitutionally maintain, along
with sixteen coeducational institutions, two which are not coedu-
cational--one male, one female:
We think undoubtedly the answer is Yes. Such a plan exalts
neither sex at the expense of the other, but to the contrary recog-
nizes the equal rights of both sexes to the benefits of the best,
most varied systems of higher education that the State can
supply.
155
A similar action was brought two years later in Allred v.
Heaton,' 6 and in that case, at least one of the plaintiffs declared
her desire to enroll in floriculture, one of the courses apparently
not available at any other campus in the Texas university sys-
tem. The court, possibly dubious of her good faith since she had
once declared an intention to study law, held that, since the
applicants (relying on the stated policy of exclusion) had not
submitted applications for admission, they were precluded from
relief. In affirming generally its earlier position with respect to
sex-segregated education, the court indicated in dictum that
should the plaintiff in fact apply for admission to study flori-
culture, she should not be excluded solely on the basis of her
sex.'57 Upon rehearing, the college moved to strike that para-
graph from the court's opinion, as constituting dictum. The
court granted the motion without comment. This was not the
only dictum in the opinion, however; consider the following:
Surely the Supreme Court of the United States will not attempt
to interfere with the public policy of the sovereign states of this
nation in the management and control of their respective education
systems so long as such systems do not discriminate against color
or race.15
8
154 Id. at 99.
155 Id. at 100.
156 336 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Civ. App.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 517 (1960).
157 Id. at 262-63.
158 Id. at 261.
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A far different view of the constitutional issues was expressed
in Kirstein v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,159
a 1970 decision involving the College of Arts and Sciences of the
University of Virginia at Charlottesville. A three-judge federal
district court held that refusal to admit women to the college
was a denial of equal protection, since the college offered courses
of instruction not found elsewhere in the state and because its
degree had greater "prestige" than that of any other state col-
lege. The court did, however, deny plaintiffs' claim for relief,
on the ground that a plan for implementing coeducation at the
campus had already been adopted. The court expressly declined
to decide whether it was impermissible for the state to operate
any institution of higher learning restricted to one sex, on the
ground that plaintiffs lacked standing to raise the issue. The
court was also careful to skirt-in a footnote-the question of
whether the ghost of Plessy v. Ferguson16 still walks: "We need
not decide on the facts of this case whether the now discounte-
nanced principle of "separate but equal" may have lingering
validity in another area-for the facilities elsewhere are not
equal with respect to these plaintiffs."16'
The most recent case to call into question a state's operation
of sex-segregated educational facilities is Wiliams v. McNair,
0 2
a suit in which several males sought to enjoin South Carolina's
operation of Winthrop College on a for-girls-only basis. South
Carolina maintains a substantial number of university-level in-
stitutions, only two of which are segregated by sex-Winthrop
and the Citadel, an all-male military academy. The court denied
relief, noting that there is a respectable body of opinion which
supports single-sex education on the ground that an educational
159 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970).
160 163 U.S. at 537 (1866).
1 309 F .Supp. at 187 n.1. There is one other recent case involving a state
university in which sex discrimination was successfully challenged on equal pro-
tection grounds. In Mollere v. Southeastern La. College, 304 F. Supp. 826 (E.D.
La. 1969), female plaintiffs complained of a rule which required all female
students under the age of 21 (regardless of their year) to live in college dormitories
while subjecting only freshman men to the same requirement. The court held the
rule to be a violation of equal protection, but the significance of its opinion is
unclear in light of the conceded fact that the rule's sole purpose was to insure
adequate income from dormitory fees; there was apparently no argument that
the policy was based in any respect on any differences between men and women.
The opinion is an interesting example of one court's application of the equality
principle in a sex-discrimination case, however, particularly in its use of a race-
discrimination analogy to make a point about arbitrary treatment. Id. at 827 n.1.
162 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 951 (1971) (justice
Harlan dissenting on the issue of whether direct appeal to the Supreme Court was
available).
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institution can advance its effectiveness by concentrating on
"areas of primary interest to only one sex." In the court's view,
this was sufficient to demonstrate that the state's discrimination
was not "wholly wanting in reason." 163 The court did not go so
far as to suggest that the state could maintain all its educational
institutions on a sex-segregated basis, but it did declare that on
the facts presented, where there were coeducational institutions
available to every student in the state, equal protection had not
been denied. The Kirstein case was distinguished with ease on
the ground that the court there had specifically found that equal
facilities were not available to women elsewhere in the state uni-
versity system. The Williams decision has recently been affirmed
without opinion by the United States Supreme Court.
The district court in Williams was careful to avoid the kind
of overt sexist rhetoric that has marred court opinions in many
sex-discrimination cases, and at first blush the decision seems
not only predictable but reasonable in light of the general avail-
ability of quality coeducation in the state. But closer examina-
tion may be in order. The statute establishing Winthrop College
described its curriculum as follows: "such education as shall fit
them [young women] for teaching" and also "stenography,
typewriting, telegfaphy, bookkeeping, drawing (freehand, me-
chanical, architectural, etc.), designing, engraving, sewing, dress-
making, millinery, art, needlework, cooking, housekeeping and
such other industrial arts as may be suitable to their sex and
conducive to their support and usefulness," together with such
other subjects "as the progress of the times may require.1"'0
To evaluate this case, it may be useful to return to the racial
analogy:
1) May the state properly operate only one college, for
whites only? Clearly not. Could it operate only one, and only for
men? The Williams opinion concedes that it could not.
2) Could it operate only two colleges, one for whites and
one for blacks? Again, clearly not. Could it operate only two
colleges, one for women and one for men? The Williams opinion
is silent. In view of the long history of male dominance, we sug-
gest that the adoption of such a scheme by a male-dominated
legislature would at least raise a constitutional question. If ac-
companied by different curricula, clearly reflecting stereotypical
attitudes about sex roles, a strong inference would arise that the
scheme reflected an assumption that women are inherently in-
163 Id. at 137.
164 Id. at 136 n.3.
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capable of education on an equal basis with men-just as clearly
as the race-segregated schools of the South indicated a similar
belief about the races.
3) Can the state operate separate schools for the races, so
long as it maintains at least some school where the races are
mixed? Any plan where the white citizens of a state were given
the option of education in black-free state colleges would seem
in clear violation of the school segregation decisions,1 5 whether
or not any integrated schools were also available. Should the
same result follow in a sex-segregation case?
To the Williams court and apparently to the Supreme Court
as well, the answer is clear: no violation here. But consider the
facts of Williams: In addition to its coeducational colleges, South
Carolina operates two sex-segregated institutions-Winthrop, a
school apparently designed to produce secretaries and home-
makers, and the Citadel, a military school offering a full range
of liberal arts and engineering degrees. To pursue the race anal-
ogy a bit further, suppose that South Carolina, in addition to
operating one or more racially mixed institutions, should main-
tain two other colleges. One, Dred Scott Institute, would offer
degrees in agriculture, music, dance and physical education; it
would accept only black students. The other, Calhoun College,
would offer degrees in nuclear physics, medicine, law, engineer-
ing and business administration; only whites need apply. Even
assuming that all of these studies were available at a biracial
institution in the state, would such a scheme survive constitu-
tional scrutiny?
It is difficult to see how; indeed, any other answer is un-
thinkable. And yet, the maintenance of two institutions for the
sexes in South Carolina, one for male warriors and the other for
female domestics, is different only in that the assumptions it
reflects about individual capabilities and aspirations are more
widely shared. The role of a housewife or a secretary is an
honorable and productive one; so of course is the role of a
champion athlete or a tenant farmer. To attack the attitudes
reflected in the Williams decision is not to denigrate the indi-
viduals for whom such stereotypes happen to be accurate; it is
to attack the arrogant assumption that merely because these
stereotypes are accurate for some individuals, the state has a
right to apply them to all individuals-and, indeed, to shape its
165 See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Goss v. Board of
Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
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official policy toward the end that they shall continue to be accu-
rate for all individuals.
F. Criminal Sentencing
State statutes prescribing the term of imprisonment for
various crimes sometimes distinguish between offenders on the
basis of sex. In some cases, the statute permits the sentencing
judge to set a fixed term (within a stated range) for an offender
of one sex, while requiring an indeterminate sentence for an of-
fender of the other.
In State v. Heitman,'" a Kansas statute provided that a fe-
male over eighteen should be sentenced to confinement for an
indeterminate term of no more than the maximum sentence fixed
by law for her offense. The female defendant had been convicted
of a misdemeanor punishable by thirty days to six months im-
prisonment and was accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate
term of six months. She appealed on equal protection grounds:
Had she been a man, the judge in his discretion could have sen-
tenced her to a fixed term of less than six months. The trial
court's action was affirmed. Although recognizing the principle
that "no different or higher punishment shall be imposed on one
than that which is prescribed for all, for the same offense,"'""
the Kansas Supreme Court concluded that sufficient differences
exist between men and women to justify classification by sex in
the correction and rehabilitation of criminals:
It required no anatomist, or physiologist, or psychologist, or
psychiatrist to tell the Legislature that women are different from
men. In structure and function human beings are still as they were
in the beginning. "Male and female created He them." It is a
patent and deep-lying fact that these fundamental anatomical
and physiological differences affect the whole psychic organization.
They create the differences in personality between men and
women, and personality is the predominating factor in delinquent
careers. It was inevitable that, in the ages during which woman
has been bearer of the race, her unique and absolutely personal
experiences, from the time of conception to the time when de-
veloped offspring attains maturity, should react on personality,
and produce what we understand to be embraced by the term
"womanhood." Woman enters spheres of sensation, perception,
emotion, desire, knowledge, and experience, of an intensity and of
a kind which man cannot know. Her individualities and peculiari-
ties are fostered by education and by social custom-whether
false and artificial or not is of no consequence here; and the result is
a feminine type radically different from the masculine type, which
166 lO Kan. 139, 181 P. 630 (1919).
167 Id. at 140-41, 181 P. at 631.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 46:675
HeinOnline -- 46 N.Y.U. L. Rev.  726 1971
SEX DISCRIMINATION
demands special consideration in the study and treatment of non-
conformity to law.16 s
It is sadly ironic that the court's opinion was largely devoted to
praise of indeterminate sentencing as an example of the scien-
tific foundation and humane approach of "the new penology."
In retrospect, the court's touching faith in the rehabilitative
capabilities of prisons seems naive at best.
Statutes of this sort apparently were not successfully chal-
lenged until 1968.169 In that year several courts, both state and
federal, concluded that such discrimination violated equal pro-
tection. The first such case was United States ex rel. Robinson
v. York,1 70 a federal habeas corpus proceeding. In this case, the
effect of the Connecticut statute was to require an indeterminate
(maximum three years) sentence for petitioner, even though a
male convicted of the same offense would receive at most a total
sentence of eighteen months. In addition to the disparity between
fixed and indeterminate sentences, the case thus raised an issue
not presented in Heitman: a longer maximum sentence for the
female. Citing Loving v. Virginia'1 ' for the proposition that equal
protection requires any racial classification to be subjected to
the "most rigid scrutiny," the Robinson court held that sex dis-
crimination should bear the same heavy burden of justification:
While the Supreme Court has not explicitly determined
whether equal protection rights of women should be tested by
this rigid standard, it is difficult to find any reason why adult
women, as one of the specific groups that compose humanity,
should have a lesser measure of protection than a racial group. 72
Tested by this standard, the statute was found wanting. Suggest-
ing that imprisonment is still imprisonment, whatever euphe-
misms may be employed to describe it, the court was unable to
discern any reason sufficient to justify the difference in treatment:
It may be granted that a broad discretion should be given to the
courts in order that the punishment imposed should bear a proper
relation to the enormity of the offense. But the circumstances
which may affect the sentences must be circumstances connected
with the crime. That there are differences between men and women
cannot be denied, but that these differences justify a longer im-
prisonment of women cannot be sustained. There is no connection
108 Id. at 146-47, 181 P. at 633-34.
109 See, e.g., Ex parte Gosselin, 141 Me. 412, 44 A.2d 882 (1945), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Gosselin v. Kelly, 328 U.S. 817 (1946); Ex parte Brady, 116
Ohio St. 512, 157 N.E. 69 (1927).
170 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968).
171 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating Virginia's antimiscegenation statute).
172 281 F. Supp. at 14.
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whatsoever between a breach of peace or resistance to arrest and
being a woman. Those misdemeanors may be committed by per-
sons of either sex.1
73
The principle announced in Robinson has since been applied in
two other Connecticut cases: once again in a federal district
court, 74 and once in the Superior Court of Connecticut. 75
In Commonwealth v. Daniel,176 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reached a similar result. The statute in that case did not
prescribe for women a sentence longer than the maximum for
men, but, like the Kansas statute attacked in Heitman, it did
deprive the court of the power to impose upon females a fixed
sentence shorter than the statutory maximum. The Daniel opin-
ion fell short of articulating the "rigid scrutiny" test employed
in Robinson; on the contrary, it stated that a "strong presump-
tion of Constitutionality' 7 7 attaches to every statute. Neverthe-
less, the court concluded:
[W]e fail to discern any reasonable and justifiable differences ...
between men and women which would justify a man being eligible
for a shorter maximum prison sentence than a woman for the
commission of the same crime, especially if there is no material
difference in their records and the relevant circumstances. 178
This opinion supports our contention that not only are many
forms of sex discrimination vulnerable when subjected to "rigid
scrutiny," but they cannot even survive a serious application of
the "rational basis" test.
179
173 Id. at 16.
174 United States ex rel. Sumrell v. York, 288 F. Supp. 955 (D. Conn. 1968).
175 Liberti v. York, 28 Conn. Supp. 9, 246 A.2d 106 (Super. Ct. 1968).
176 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968).
177 Id. at 650, 243 A.2d at 404.
178 Id.
179 The principle of the Daniel case has also been applied in Pennsylvania
to the issue of where the defendant will be imprisoned. In Commonwealth v.
Stauffer, 214 Pa. Super. 113, 251 A.2d 718 (1969), the defendant had been
sentenced to a state penitentiary for women. On appeal, she was ordered returned
to the county jail, it being conceded that any man convicted of the same offense
would be confined in a county institution. The opinion nowhere suggests that
separate imprisonment of men and women is constitutionally suspect; it does,
however, suggest that the type of confinement must be substantially the same for
both sexes.
Another recent Pennsylvania case involved still a different type of sex dis-
crimination. In In re Williams, 210 Pa. Super. 388, 234 A.2d 37 (1967), aff'd
sub nom. In re Jones, 432 Pa. 44, 246 A.2d 356 (1968), the commitment of two
youthful males to a correctional institution as "defective delinquent juveniles"
was challenged on the ground that the stated procedure was applicable only to
males. The Superior Court held the constitutional challenge to be without merit,
supporting its holding largely by quotations from its opinion in the Daniel case,
210 Pa. Super. 156, 232 A.2d 247 (1967), later reversed by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. The issue of unconstitutional sex discrimination was apparently
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In light of the consistent holdings in these recent cases,
Wark v. State80 is a disagreeable surprise. For escaping from a
Maine prison farm, the defendant had been sentenced to an addi-
tional term of six to twelve years. He contended (and the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Maine assumed) that a female convicted
of escaping from the women's reformatory would have been sub-
ject to a maximum sentence of no more than eleven months.
Appellant therefore argued that his sentence constituted a denial
of equal protection. The court distinguished the recent sentenc-
ing cases on the ground that they involved sex discrimination
justified only by considerations of rehabilitation and "reform."
Maine's statute, said the court, was enacted for a different rea-
son: deterrence of a particular offense. With respect to escape,
the court felt, the "distinctive attributes of the sexes" were both
"relevant" and "controlling":"81
The Legislature could on the basis of long experience conclude
that women, even those sentenced to the State Prison for serious
offenses, tend for the most part to be more amenable to discipline
and custodial regulation than their male counterparts and can
therefore be effectively confined in an institution which lacks the
high walls, armed guards and security precautions of a prison.
By the same token the Legislature could reasonably conclude that
the greater physical strength, aggressiveness and disposition
toward violent action so frequently displayed by a male prisoner
bent on escape from a maximum security institution presents a far
greater risk of harm to prison guards and personnel and to the
public than is the case when escape is undertaken by a woman
confined in an institution designed primarily for reform and re-
habilitation. Viewing statutory provisions for punishment as in
part a deterrent to criminal conduct, the Legislature could logically
and reasonably conclude that a more severe penalty should be
not argued on appeal. Cf. Chambers v. Director, 244 Md. 697, 223 A.2d 774
(1966) (dictum that limiting a state procedure for the treatment of "defective
delinquents" to males is not unconstitutional). But see Morgan v. State, 179 Ind.
300, 101 N.E. 6 (1913) (holding unconstitutional a state statute providing for
the commitment to an institution for "insane criminals" of any male defendant
acquitted of a felony charge solely by reason of insanity).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also indicated a willingness to extend
the principle of the Daniel case to invalidate sentences meted out to juvenile
offenders that are longer than those imposed on adults for identical offenses.
In re Wilson, 438 Pa. 405, 430-32, 264 A.2d 614, 617-18 (1970). At least one other
court has rejected this approach, in the absence of a showing by the accused
that the state's juvenile correction system is devoid of rehabilitative aspects be-
yond those of mere confinement and discipline. Smith v. State, 444 S.W.2d 941,
948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969). See also the cases cited in Comment, 82 Harv. L.
Rev. 921, 925-26 n.25 (1969). On the general topic of sentencing, see Rubin,
Disparity and Equality of Sentences: A Constitutional Challenge, 40 F.R.D. 55
(1967).
180 266 A.2d 62 (Me.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 952 (1970).
181 Id. at 64.
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imposed upon a male prisoner escaping from the State Prison than
upon a woman confined at the 'Reformatory' while serving a
State Prison sentence who escapes from that institution. We con-
clude that a classification based on sex under these circumstances
is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable but is a proper exercise of
legislative discretion which in no way violates the constitutional
right to equal protection of the law.'8 2
One indication of the tenacity of sex stereotyping is the
fact that an opinion like that in Wark will so often seem sensible
on first reading-at least to a male reader. After all, men are
bigger and stronger on the average than women; if we were
prison guards, we would probably be more afraid of an escaping
male prisoner than a female. Isn't the court's reasoning therefore
correct?
The trouble with the court's approach is that, in its pre-
occupation with group characteristics, it ignores the fact that
the law punishes individuals. Again, the best way to illustrate
the defect in this approach may be by analogy. For instance, sup-
pose it could be demonstrated that persons of one race do commit
a particular crime more frequently (in proportion to their num-
bers) than persons of other races. Could the state constitution-
ally prescribe a higher sentence for persons of that race who
commit that crime, on the sole ground that this would constitute
a greater deterrent to those who most need to be deterred? The
answer-even if one did not agree with it-is clear. Can similar
sex discrimination be any more justifiable?
Of course, it might be argued that the Wark court was
speaking not only of propensity to commit the crime, but also of
ability to commit it. Men are, by and large, bigger and stronger
than women; not only may they be more likely to try to escape,
they could be more likely to succeed. Is it not then proper for the
state to consider this factor in fashioning a sentencing statute
aimed at deterrence?
Since it is awkward to pursue a racial analogy at this point
(it being virtually impossible for the writers to imagine any
crime which members of one race have more ability to com-
mit),183 let us use another physical characteristic which, like
sex and race, is not the result of individual choice: the ability
to see. It seems perfectly plausible to assume that sighted per-
sons are more capable than blind persons of committing virtually
182 Id. at 65.
183 For one hypothetical example, see the suggestion by Professor Graham
Hughes in The Right to Special Treatment, in The Rights of Americans 102 (N.
Dorsen ed. 1971).
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any crime. Would a statute be valid which provided that for any
blind adult convicted of a felony, the penalty should be reduced
by one-half?
If such a statute would be held to violate equal protection,
the statute in Wark should clearly fare no better. Even if the
hypothetical statute could be upheld, however, the Wark statute
is still deficient by comparison. It distinguishes between defen-
dants not on the basis of their individual characteristics, but
solely on the basis of the extent to which two groups differ in
average size and strength--differences which may not at all
apply to particular individuals within either group.
In support of the Wark result, it might further be argued
that men may properly be confined in separate institutions, made
more "escape-proof" than those for women. This point may be
well-taken; 84 even so, it does not necessarily follow that a higher
sentence is in order for the crime of escape by a male, since, as
the Wark court recognized, the sentence is properly to be re-
garded as "punishment," even though it may have a deterrent
effect. It might well be argued that a defendant cannot properly
be punished in part simply for being a male. Nor, even if all
males were bigger, stronger and more aggressive than all females,
is the statute necessarily justifiable by analogy to criminal stat-
utes which punish an offense more harshly when accompanied
by a greater threat of harm, e.g., "armed robbery." In those
cases, the offender may be influenced in his choice of weapons
by the varying punishments held out. The male does not choose
his sex, however; in our view, he therefore cannot appropriately
be punished for it.
G. Consortium
The concept of "consortium" combines two disparate ele-
ments: (1) companionship and affection (including sexual re-
lations) between spouses, and (2) the right of one spouse to the
services of the other spouse.18 5 It will come as no surprise to the
reader that originally both of these elements were obligations
owed by wives to their husbands, but not vice versa. The under-
lying assumptions about sex roles are by now all too familiar:
184 Some doubt may be cast on this proposition, however, by a decision
such as Commonwealth v. Stauffer, 214 Pa. Super. 113, 251 A.2d 718 (1969).
See note 179 supra. Stauffer can be distinguished, however, on the ground that
in that case it was a female defendant who was being treated as the greater risk.
18r See Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 651
(1930).
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But the right of consortium was by no means fully expressed
[at common law] in the terms of society, companionship, and con-
jugal affection. The right to service was a prominent factor in it,
and in respect to certain kinds of injuries, without doubt, the pre-
dominant factor. If we go back to the times when it took on its
meaning the conditions were that the wife was socially and legally
regarded as the husband's inferior, as having her existence merged
into that of her husband, and as owing to him the duty, which he
was entitled to command, of serving and administering to him in
all the relations of domestic life. Her emancipation of recent years
was centuries in the future. She was looked upon as the servant of
and ministrant to her liege lord, to whom and to whose interests
she was, by virtue of her marriage vow, devoted. He was entitled
to her services, and these she was expected to render in the care
of his home, in the rearing of his children, and in attending upon
his wants.'8 6
Since wifely services could easily be equated with those of any
servant, legal liability for interference with the master-servant
relationship was easily extended to cases of injury to the husband-
wife relationship.18 7 Eventually, loss of consortium became rec-
ognized as a material element of damage in four types of actions
by husbands against third parties: (1) criminal conversation,
(2) alienation of affection, (3) malicious interference with the
marital relationship and (4) negligent personal injury to the wife,
resulting in loss of her services.
While corresponding recovery was available to wives in ac-
tions of the first three types, it was not in the fourth. Four pri-
mary reasons were advanced to justify this dichotomy.' By
1950, courts in at least eighteen jurisdictions had accepted these
arguments,8 9 with no clear holdings to the contrary.1' Not-
withstanding this overwhelming support for the no-recovery rule,
each of the four assigned justifications is questionable.
The first is that a wife had no common law right to main-
tain an action in her own name. This argument is of little or no
weight now that such disabilities have been removed; at any
rate, it hardly justifies denial of a cause of action for only one
of the four types of injury to the marital relationship.
186 Marri v. Stamford St. R.R., 84 Conn. 9, 12, 78 A. 582, 583 (1911).
187 Lippman, supra note 185, at 652-53.
188 For a good short discussion of these rationales, see Note, Equal Protec-
tion: The Wife's Action For Loss of Consortium, 54 Iowa L. Rev. 510, 517-21
(1968). For a trenchant criticism of the rule barring recovery by wives, see
Foster, Relational Interests of the Family, 1962 U. Ill. LYF. 493, 520.
189 See cases cited in Hittafer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 812-13 n.5
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
190 To the extent that Hipp v. E.I. Dupont, 182 N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318 (1921)
was not in accord, it was overruled by Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N.C.
120, 127-29, 126 S.E. 307, 311-12 (1925).
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The second argument is that, in the first three types of ac-
tion, the wife's injury is "direct," but in the fourth it is merely
"consequential." Even if this distinction does have some validity,
however, it affords no apparent justification for applying this
limitation to wives but not to husbands.
A third rationale advanced in favor of the no-recovery rule
is that a wife has no right to the services of her husband, as
contrasted with his companionship, affection, etc. This argument
depends on the premise that the only element of recovery in the
wife's consortium action would be loss of services. This premise
appears unjustified, however, since the husband's recovery for
loss of consortium has always included damages for loss of con-
jugal relations as well as loss of services."' Moreover, even if
loss of services were the only element of recovery, the wife might
nevertheless be entitled to a cause of action by virtue of the
Married Women's Acts. These acts removed many disabilities
formerly imposed upon married women, and they could have
been interpreted as giving the wife a reciprocal right to her
husband's services. But they were not. 92
The fourth reason for denying the wife's recovery for loss
of consortium is that the husband in his own action against the
tortfeasor can recover for impairment of his ability to provide
support. Permitting the wife to sue the same defendant for loss
of her husband's services would therefore result in double re-
covery. Since husbands do have a duty to support their wives,
it must be conceded that this rationale has some validity, and
recent opinions have treated it as the determinative issue in
evaluating the no-recovery rule.
The leading authority for rejection of the no-recovery rule
on nonconstitutional grounds is Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.193 In
this case of first impression, the court carefully considered the
principal justifications for the rule, and found each of them in-
sufficient. The court answered the double recovery argument by
asserting that it would be a simple matter to deduct from the
wife's damages any amount recoverable by the husband for im-
pairment of support.' Rejecting the unbroken succession of
contrary precedent in other jurisdictions as based on "specious
191 See Lippman, supra note 185, at 665-69.
192 In a few jurisdictions, the Married Women's Act was held to deprive
the husband of his cause of action for loss of consortium, forcing him to share
the wife's disability. See, e.g., Marri v. Stamford St. R.R., 84 Conn. 9, 78 A. 582
(1911); Bolger v. Boston Elevated Ry., 205 Mass. 420, 91 N.E. 389 (1910);
Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1945).
103 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
104 Id. at 819.
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and fallacious reasoning," the court then adopted for the District
of Columbia a rule allowing the wife to recover. 195
In the twenty-one years since Hitaffer, a number of courts
have been called upon to reconsider the wisdom of continued
adherence to the no-recovery rule. Although the decisions have
been divided, Hitaffer has attracted a considerable following.1
Indeed, very recent cases indicate a clear trend in favor of per-
mitting recovery.197 In this area at least, the courts appear to be
awakening to the fact that rules of law based upon outmoded
concepts of uxorial status do not deserve contemporary reaffir-
mation.
In jurisdictions where the courts have refused to abandon
the no-recovery rule, it is not surprising that equal protection
claims have been raised. In two recent diversity cases, federal
district courts in Michigan and Illinois were required to apply
Indiana law in determining whether a wife could recover for loss
of consortium. Since Indiana precedent at the time was clearly
against recovery, 198 the only question was whether such a rule
contravened the fourteenth amendment. In one case,199 the opin-
ion simply announced the court's conclusion that the Indiana
rule violated equal protection. In Karczewski v. Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad,20 however, a similar conclusion was reached only
after a carefully stated analysis of the problem. After reviewing
the standard arguments against recovery, the court rejected them
as unconvincing:
195 The Hitaffer case involved two different issues: whether a wife can
recover for loss of consortium as a matter of general law, and whether the work-
men's compensation statute for the District of Columbia permitted any recovery
for loss of consortium. The court answered both questions affirmatively. In
Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 914
(1957), Hiaffer was overruled on the second issue. It was reaffirmed on the
first issue, however, in Rollins v. District of Columbia, 265 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir.
1959).
196 See W. Prosser, Torts § 119 (3d ed. 1964); Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 695, at 13-21 (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1969); Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1378
(1952).
197 Three recent decisions following Hitaffer and overruling contrary prec-
edent are Troue v. Marker, 252 N.E.2d 800 (Ind. 1969); Millington v. South-
eastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 239 N.E.2d 897, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1968);
and Clouston v. Remlinger Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc., 22 Ohio St. 2d 65, 258
N.E.2d 230 (1970). Pennsylvania reaffirmed its adherence to the no-recovery rule
by a 9-2 margin in Brown v. Glenside Lumber & Coal Co., 429 Pa. 601, 240 A.2d
822 (1968).
198 Burk v. Anderson, 232 Ind. 77, 109 N.E.2d 407 (1952); Boden v. Del-
Mar Garage, 209 Ind. 59, 185 N.E. 860 (1933); Miller v. Sparks, 136 Ind. App.
148, 189 N.E.2d 720 (1963). All three were expressly overruled in Troue v.
Marker, 252 N.E.2d 800, 806 (Ind. 1969).
199 Owen v. Illinois Baking Corp., 260 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
200 274 F. Supp. 169 (NJ). Ili. 1967).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 46:675
HeinOnline -- 46 N.Y.U. L. Rev.  734 1971
SEX DISCRIMINATION
[T]hat women cannot sue for loss of consortium is not excusable
because based upon an historical legal doctrine which viewed a
woman as her husband's chattel or "servant." Some positive justifi-
cation is required. Nothing persuasive is offered by any of the cases
which deny her this right.
Marriage is no longer viewed as a "master-servant" relation-
ship. It has assumed a special status in which each party has equal
rights under the law.201
Concluding that there was in fact no rational basis for the no-
recovery rule, the court then held it to be a violation of equal
protection
0 2
Slightly more than a year later, however, Karczewski was in
effect overruled by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
Miskunas v. Union Carbide Corp 0 3 In that case, the Indiana
no-recovery rule was again contested on equal protection grounds.
The only rational basis that the court could discover for the
Indiana rule was the avoidance of double recovery. But that, it
felt, was sufficient:
Because a husband can recover for lost earnings, Indiana
could reasonably conclude that it would be undesirable to give
the wife an action that might permit double recovery. Since 87.8%
of married men are employed and only 34.4% of wives are em-
ployed, Indiana could justifiably discriminate in this respect
between the spouses. Indiana could infer that more often in a
wife's suit than a husband's, the jury would award her duplicating
damages for some of the same elements of injury.20 4
At first glance, the employment statistics relied upon by the
court seem to support its conclusion that there is a rational basis
for the no-recovery rule, since they do demonstrate that the great
majority of actions by wives will involve the possibility of dou-
ble recovery. On closer examination, however, the figures reveal
that, for 12% of the wives, an action for loss of consortium
could not possibly result in double recovery. The arbitrariness
of the no-recovery rule is demonstrated by the unfairness of its
application to these wives. If the double-recovery problem is
sufficiently acute to warrant an exclusionary rule at all, using
the plaintiff's sex as the basis for exclusion seems questionable.
201 Id. at 175.
202 Contra, Krohn v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 219 Tenn. 37, 406 S.W.2d
166 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 970 (1967) ; Seagraves v. Legg, 147 NV. Va. 331,
127 S.E.2d 605 (1962).
203 399 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1066 (1969). At the
time of the Miskunas decision, both Illinois and Wisconsin had followed Hitaffer.
Subsequently, Indiana did also. Troue v. Marker, 252 N.E.2d 800 (Ind. 1969).
The equal protection issue now appears moot in the Seventh Circuit, except as to
causes of action arising prior to the changes in state law.
204 399 F.2d at 850.
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It would be much fairer (and would impose no special burden
on the courts) to entertain the wife's cause of action at least in
every case where the husband was unemployed at the time of
injury.
The consortium cases reflect a variety of ways in which
sexist patterns of thought retain their influence over rules of law.
In its inception, the rule granting only the husband an action
for loss of consortium was blatantly male-supremacist: At com-
mon law, wives could be analogized to servants; a husband could
therefore claim the benefit of the established cause of action for
loss of the services of a negligently injured servant. Today, of
course, no court could seriously declare that a husband is the
"master" of his wife and that he is entitled to her services, com-
panionship and sexual attentions without incurring any reciprocal
obligations. Where the no-recovery rule survives, its principal
justification is now the fear of double recovery-seemingly more
a rationalization than a reason.
Although not stressed in judicial opinions, there may be
another reason why the no-recovery rule is still adhered to.
There is ample evidence that American courts have been reluc-
tant to extend tort liability for purely "emotional" injury-largely
because of their apprehension that indulgent juries will award
excessive damages, given the intangible nature of such an injury
and the ease with which it can be feigned. Thus, negligent in-
fliction of mental suffering has only recently received wide recog-
nition as a compensable wrong. 05 The principal element in a
wife's consortium recovery is apt to be the loss of her husband's
companionship and affection; it would hardly be surprising if
many courts regard this as an essentially "psychological" injury,
requiring similar caution.
If this hypothesis is valid, then judicial retention of the no-
recovery rule is understandable, but hardly commendable. Even
if the fear of unjustified recoveries does furnish sufficient reason
for a rule of exclusion, it surely does not require the perpetuation
of irrational distinctions based on sex alone. Whatever the rule,
it should be the same for both sexes; both should be permitted
to recover, or neither.
H. Conclusions from the cases
Although the above cases deal with sex discrimination in a
wide variety of activities, they by no means exhaust the examples
which might be shown. We believe they are sufficient, however,
to demonstrate the following general propositions:
205 See generally W. Prosser, Torts § 5 (3d ed. 1964).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[VCol. 46:675
HeinOnline -- 46 N.Y.U. L. Rev.  736 1971
SEX DISCRIMINATION
(1) Despite the enactment of various laws designed to im-
prove the position of women, male-dominated legislatures and
courts have historically exhibited the belief that women gen-
erally are-and ought to be-confined to the social roles of
homemaker, wife and mother, and gainfully employed (if at all)
only in endeavors which comport with their assumed subservient,
child-oriented and decorative characteristics;
(2) A small but significant number of courts has recently
perceived that some legislation mandating sex discrimination
presents substantial constitutional questions, and several such
laws have been struck down on equal protection grounds;
(3) Despite such holdings by a number of state and lower
federal courts, opinions continue to appear in which both the
result and the reasoning are virtually indistinguishable from
those issued nearly a century ago. In the absence of a definite
shift of position on the part of the Supreme Court, and in the
face of continued adherence by many state and federal courts
to traditional sexist attitudes, it is far too soon to assert that a
clear trend toward judicial recognition of women's rights has
developed. -00
20G The Supreme Court has never squarely held that any form of sex dis-
crimination violates the equal protection guarantee. Moreover, as recently as the
spring of 1971, in Williams v. McNair, 401 U.S. 951 (1971), the Court summarily
affirmed a decision upholding South Carolina's operation of a sex-segregated col-
lege against an equal protection challenge. (We have already noted our reservations
about the Court's disposition of that case; see text accompanying notes 162-65
supra.) Since no opinion was handed down in Williams, however, there is no way
to discover the basis for the Court's conclusion that no constitutional violation
had been demonstrated.
The Court obviously has not foreclosed the possibility that some forms of
sex discrimination can violate the guarantee of equal protection, however, as
evidenced by its agreement to hear at least three cases in which this issue is
directly presented: Reed v. Reed, 93 Idaho 511, 465 P.2d 635 (1970), prob. juris.
noted, 461 U.S. 934 (1971), discussed in the text accompanying notes 57-63 supra;
In re Stanley, 45 Ill.2d 132, 256 N.E.2d 814 (1970), cert. granted sub nom. Stanley
v. Illinois, 400 U.S. 1020 (1971), involving alleged discrimination against the male
parent in awarding custody of illegitimate children; and State v. Alexander, 255
La. 941, 233 So.2d 891 (1970), cert. granted sub nom. Alexander v. Louisiana,
401 U.S. 936 (1971), involving a claim that females were systematically excluded
from the grand jury which returned a rape indictment against the defendant, a
male Negro. (The state court's opinion in the Alexander case indicates that race
discrimination was the principal ground of defendant's motion to quash the in-
dictment, however.) The decisions in these three cases are expected to reveal the
attitudes of the current members of the Court toward equal protection as it ap-
plies to sex discrimination.
It must be acknowledged, however, that several recent Supreme Court deci-
sions have appeared to restrict, rather than enlarge, the scope of the equal protec-
tion clause. In James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), the Court upheld a provision
of the California constitution prohibiting construction of any low rent housing
project unless it bad received prior approval in a local referendum. Petitioners
had contended that this special obstacle to the provision of low income housing
discriminated against the poor, violating their right to equal protection. In Hunter
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SEX AND RACE
In nearly every section of this study, we have advanced the
analogy of racial discrimination in order to clarify and strengthen
our arguments that various forms of sex discrimination consti-
tute a denial of equal protection. Although we elected to post-
pone discussion of the general aptness of the analogy between
race and sex, we are of course aware that the reader may not be
ready to concede the validity of any argument based primarily
on such an analogy. We are convinced, however, that each ex-
ample we have suggested is appropriate and that all of them can
be justified by the same general considerations.
Analytically, state-enforced sex discrimination is virtually
identical to racial discrimination in at least three significant
ways: (1) each reflects a group stereotype based on imputed
characteristics which, if not purely imaginary, are nonetheless
inapplicable to many individual members of the group; (2) each
provides governmental endorsement for the opinion privately
held by members of a dominant group that, due to the supposed
v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), the Court had earlier held invalid a similar law
requiring a referendum as a prerequisite to the passage of any "fair housing"
ordinance designed to prohibit racial discrimination. Mr. Justice Black (the sole
dissenter in Hunter) wrote the Court's opinion in James; four justices joined him
in refusing to extend the Hunter holding to invalidate discrimination which was
apparently directed only against persons of low income, without regard to race.
(Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun dissented; Justice Douglas did not
participate.)
In Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) and Glona v. American Guarantee
and Liability Insurance Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) the Court (dividing 6-3) declared
discriminatory treatment of illegitimates in a state's Wrongful Death Act to be a
violation of equal protection. After Chief Justice Warren and Justice Fortas had
been replaced by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, however, a new 5-4
majority reached a different conclusion in Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971),
involving an illegitimate's right to inherit from his natural father. Mr. Justice
Black, again writing the majority opinion, attempted in Labine to distinguish
Levy and Glona; Labine nevertheless casts great doubt on the validity of the
proposition-which arguably had been established in Levy and Glona-that il-
legitimacy constitutes a "suspect classification" for purposes of equal protection.
These decisions indicate that the Court is sharply divided over the scope of
the equal protection clause, and specifically over the question of what (if any)
application it may have outside the area of race discrimination. In this regard,
see also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), especially the discussion at 126-31
(Mr. Justice Black's opinion, seemingly arguing that the fourteenth amendment
applies only to racial discrimination) and 150-52 (appendix to the opinion of Mr.
justice Douglas, listing cases said to have struck down, on equal protection grounds,
statutes discriminating on bases other than race). The only prediction that the
authors feel safe in making about the three currently pending cases is that the
decisions are not likely to be unanimous, and are even less likely to be embodied
in a single opinion.
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existence of these characteristics, each member of the subordi-
nate group is inherently inferior; and (3) proceeding from the
assumption that the stereotypes are accurate, each attempts to
confirm and perpetuate the existence of the supposed character-
istics by requiring every citizen to conform to a variety of rules,
all of which reflect the belief that one group is in fact inferior
to another.
The falsity of certain racial stereotypes, notably with re-
spect to blacks and American Indians, has become widely recog-
nized in recent years. That the female stereotype is also untrue
(and even a bit foolish) has been convincingly argued by many,
but the myth of female inferiority stubbornly persists-even
among supposedly enlightened judges. The preceding sections
document the consistency with which our (overwhelmingly male)
judiciary has supported enactments of our (predominately male)
state legislatures that require women to conform to the expec-
tations of the dominant group. In addition, the case law clearly
shows that women have been denied equal treatment in employ-
ment, public education, places of public accommodation and-
shamefully-in those supposed bastions of "equal justice," the
criminal and civil courts. In all of these respects, contemporary
sex discrimination closely resembles the pre-Brown pattern of
racial discrimination by law.
As bases for classification, sex and race share three impor-
tant similarities: (1) by and large, members of the subordinate
group are readily identifiable; (2) membership in the "inferior"
group is initially nonvolitional; and (3) once acquired, this
membership cannot be renounced. (Particularly in the last re-
spect, race and sex discrimination are of a different order from
discrimination against the poor or the young; members of these
latter groups are not inevitably trapped for life in a subordinate
status.) It is repugnant to the most rudimentary sense of fair-
ness that a person should be officially relegated to an inferior
status, severely limiting his opportunities for self-expression and
achievement, solely because of an accident of birth. Stripped to
its essentials, this is precisely the effect of racial and sex dis-
crimination.
Belatedly, whites are starting to comprehend the enormity
of the injustice perpetrated upon nonwhites in America. White
males, on the other hand, have hardly begun to recognize that
the society we control has visited exactly the same type of in-
justice upon nonmales-though admittedly with less heinous
consequences. Notwithstanding the fact that a far greater degree
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of visible harm has been suffered by nonwhites than by females,
a general pattern of economic and political disadvantage is easily
demonstrable in both cases.
In terms of other, less obvious effects upon individual mem-
bers of the subordinate group, sex and race discrimination are
again distressingly similar. When it enforces either kind of dis-
crimination with a broad range of sanctions, the state encourages
its citizens to relate to each other according to group stereo-
types, rather than as individuals. This is dehumanizing-for the
dominant group as well as the subordinate. But the effect on the
"inferior" individuals is particularly unfortunate: constant sub-
jection to pervasive reinforcement of group stereotypes tends to
influence--to distort-their perception of themselves. As one
recent commentator put it:
Lowered cultural expectations of success and higher expectations
of failure result in a self-fulfilling prophecy: From those of whom
little is expected little is achieved. These patterns of discourage-
ment, the perpetuation in our education processes of women as
"helpmate," the absence of "appropriateness," all these handicaps
to women in our society are key factors in a woman's choosing to
be a nurse rather than a doctor, a law secretary rather than a
lawyer, a researcher rather than a writer, a teacher rather than a
practitioner.20
7
At best, these effects of racial and sex discrimination are waste-
ful of invaluable human resources; at worst, they are damaging
and degrading to the individuals affected.
In light of all these similarities between the operation and
effects of both types of state-imposed discrimination in educa-
tion, employment and the judicial process, we believe it entirely
appropriate to use racial analogies to assist in the resolution of
cases involving the rights of women. Indeed, we would contend
that, at least with respect to the areas surveyed above, both
types of discrimination should be subjected to the identical
equal protection standard.
True, there may be areas of state regulation where the anal-
ogy between sex and race should not be employed-where cer-
tain types of sex discrimination should be recognized as valid
although corresponding racial discrimination would not be. Sev-
eral areas of law not discussed above quite explicitly distinguish
between the sexes, and often operate upon them unequally. One
obvious example is the regulation of sexual activity by criminal
statutes that punish one sex exclusively or more severely than
207 Sassower, supra note 13, at 330.
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the other; another is the regulation of family relationships by
statutes-such as those relating to marriage and divorce, abor-
tion and sterilization, child custody and support, etc.-that in
many ways define the rights and duties of the marital partners
differently according to their sex. There are those who feel that
all laws governing sexual conduct and familial relationships are
in need of drastic overhauling, so as to make them completely
neutral between the sexes. On the other hand, many would argue
that there are basic societal interests in these areas which might
be threatened by such a readjustment.
One need not hold any particular opinion about society's
regulation of sexual activity and marriage, however, in order to
respond to the issues of equal protection arising in education,
employment, and the judicial process. On the contrary, the argu-
ment for sex equality in these areas is made even more compel-
ling by the fact that the sexual discriminations there involved
have nothing whatever to do with sexual activity or inherent sex
differences. This is not to deny that equal protection issues may
be raised by laws regulating sexual conduct or familial relation-
ships; it is simply to suggest that such issues should be all the
more visible in the many cases where sex differences or sexual
activity are not directly involved.
IV
JUDIcIAL ATTITUDES ToWARD SEx DIsCRIMINATION CASES
Despite the strong argument that sex discrimination has
much the same destructive potential as race discrimination, it is
nevertheless undeniable that American judges have responded
more readily to claims of injury from the latter. It is possible, of
course, that this merely establishes that sex discrimination is not
inherently harmful-thereby disproving our thesis. It is also
possible, however, that there are reasons why male American
judges should have difficulty in perceiving its harmful effects.
We should like to offer our intuitive suggestions as to what some
of these reasons may be. We believe that what follows is to a
great extent applicable to all males, although our primary con-
cern is with the extent to which it may be true of judges in
particular.
The failure of any male to perceive the harmful potential
of various sexually discriminatory laws and practices can per-
haps be initially ascribed simply to a lack of knowledge. This is
particularly true in contrast with race discrimination. For at
least the past ten years, the white public has been exposed to a
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rather steady and wide-ranging stream of information about the
effects of one hundred years of segregation and discrimination
on the black citizens of America. Only recently, however, has the
public begun to be aware of the injurious effects of sex discrim-
ination. It is the responsibility of counsel, of course, to educate
the judge about the facts of any lawsuit, and in a case involving
sex discrimination, this includes helping him to understand in
what respects the practice complained of is harmful to those
affected.
Like most other men, male judges suffer from an additional
handicap in comprehending the effects of sex discrimination. With
respect to race, it is likely that the white judge has close personal
association with few if any black persons; although his informa-
tion about the harms of race discrimination may therefore be
secondhand, it nevertheless may have considerable validity for
the black population in general. Virtually every judge, however,
is in daily contact with one or more women on a close personal
basis-a wife, a daughter, a mother, a sister, or one or more
office employees. If the women with whom he is associated are
all apparently happy and satisfied, he is likely to conclude from
this that all "sensible" women are content with their lot. In this
respect, judges-like the authors of law review articles-must be
alert to the dangers in overgeneralizing from their personal experi-
ence.
Even assuming that a judge does understand the effects of
sex discrimination, he may nevertheless be deterred from granting
relief in a particular case because of personal attitudes of which
he is not even aware. There are a number of emotional responses
to "women's liberation" which it seems to us are shared by
many men, including some judges. One of these, the fear of
competition from individual women, is probably not present in
the judge's case; judges, by and large, hold positions where
women are no particular danger to either job retention or
possible promotion. This may of course change in another gen-
eration, as the proportion of female law graduates rapidly in-
creases, but for the present generation of judges, women probably
pose little or no threat of personal competition.
In a more abstract way, however, competition from women
as a group may indeed seem to threaten the judge's interests.
Most judges hold their offices at least in part because of past
activity in a political organization under predominately mascu-
line control. Although there are of course able and successful
female practitioners of the art of politics, they remain exceptions
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proving the rule that politics, like most exercises of power, is
still a "man's game." Any change in the respective roles of the
sexes which militates against such masculine domination-even
if only in an insubstantial, largely symbolic way (as for example
the question of whether women should serve on juries)-may
stir uneasiness in the heart of one amply rewarded by, and
comfortable with, the political status quo.
Fear of economic or political competition, even if wholly
subconscious, is of course an obvious reason why one might
be moved to support discriminatory practices. There are, how-
ever, other emotions which may influence any male judge's
response to a suit involving sex discrimination. All lawyers know
that the "law" as represented by the results of litigated cases
is as much the product of the court's evaluation of the "morality"
of the parties' behavior and the "fairness" of the possible de-
cisions as it is of any set of abstract rules. One way in which a
good judge will utilize his emotional responses in partnership
with his intellect is by engaging in a process of empathy-
attempting to perceive the case before him as it is viewed by the
parties themselves. Olympian detachment is indeed the best pos-
ture from which to render final decision, but it should be assumed
only after the judge has first exercised his ability to empathize
with the parties to the lawsuit.
Faced with a black man's complaint of racial discrimination,
a white judge may well do at least a passable job of empathizing
with the plaintiff-of temporarily imagining himself to be black-
skinned. This will of course vary with the judge's own condition-
ing on the matter of race. For a judge taught from birth to regard
every black person as a subhuman creature, empathizing with a
black man is as inconceivable as empathizing with an eagle
or a Labrador retriever. The judge not so severely handicapped,
however, will be able to imagine how it would feel to be on the
receiving end of such discriminatory treatment. From this per-
spective, the judge's answer to the hypothetical question "How
would I feel if someone did that to me?" is likely to be "Furious! "
-because if there is anyone unaccustomed to being treated as
inferior or subordinate, it is a white male American judge.
Having subjected himself, even if fleetingly, to what he imagines
to be the plaintiff's mental tribulations, the judge is better
equipped to test the parties' competing claims against an abstract
principle of law.
Where sex discrimination is alleged, however, most male
judges are likely to have considerable difficulty empathizing with
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a female complainant. Even before the typical American child
first becomes aware of sex differences, he (or she) is conditioned
to conform to the social role expected of his sex-which interests
he should pursue (and which to shun), which occupations he
should consider (and which to ignore), how he should talk, walk,
think and feel. And one of the very worst things he can do, in
society's eyes, is to express a desire to be-or to behave as though
he were-a member of the other sex. Although there is some
evidence that preoccupation with secondary sex differences may
be declining, for the present generation of judges it may be easier
to assume the imagined mental state of a black male, of whatever
station in life, than it is successfully to imagine that one is a
female (even a white, middle-class one). The wonder is not that
some judges display insensitivity toward the sexist features of
our society but rather that an increasing number of judges are
apparently able to break through the strictures of their own con-
ditioning.
An even more deeply rooted emotion which judges share with
most of mankind is a general hostility to change-especially
change of such a fundamental and far-reaching character as to
transform radically the basic institutions of society. Although
complaints about sex discrimination may focus on particular
practices, the whole battery of "women's liberation" goals seems
to some (both men and women) to portend a future society in
which the roles of men and women as members of a family unit
would be so different from those of today as to make it almost
unrecognizable. Perhaps children would not be raised by their
parents at all; perhaps marriage as we know it would disappear
completely; perhaps the concept of "family" would mean some-
thing completely different-or nothing at all. To many white
southerners of twenty years ago, the end of racial segregation
seemed to spell the end of civilization. For the elderly or even
middle-aged person today, any prospect of a basic change in the
family structure of society as he has known it may seem equally
disquieting. Even the most modest demand for equality, if per-
ceived as the spearhead of a wide-ranging assault on the social
order, may thus be viewed as a threat. But the reconciliation of
stability and change is the essence of the judicial function; judges
are therefore required to transcend their natural aversion to
change-to join in shaping the course of social evolution, rather
than adamantly opposing it.
If the above analysis has any validity, it follows that male
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judges are likely to decide issues of sex discrimination from a
narrow perspective and under certain psychological handicaps.
Are any countermeasures available to them?
First, the judge can avoid the temptation to dismiss sum-
marily any claim of impermissible sex discrimination as "lacking
in substance." The fact that a particular statute or practice has
received general acquiescence for many years from both males
and females should not foreclose judicial consideration of its
constitutionality. (Here again, race discrimination furnishes an
instructive parallel.)
The next suggestion is implicit in what has been said earlier
about the process of judicial empathy. The judge must make a
conscious effort to educate himself as to the effect of the statute
or practice in question, from the point of view of the different
types of women it affects. If the statute is one which prohibits all
women from engaging in a certain occupation, for instance, he
cannot be content with merely considering whether he, a mature
male, is inclined to think that women generally ought not to
engage in the proscribed activity (much less whether he thinks
his own wife or daughter should do so). Rather, he must consider
how a variety of women-single women as well as married, older
women as well as young, black women and white, those with
much education and those with little, those with children and
those with none-are affected.
Further questions should be explored: Do the reasons ad-
vanced to support the discrimination in question apply only to
some women? To some men, as well? Does it represent an expres-
sion of the stereotype of woman as a homebody, fit only for
domestic labor? Or as some sort of harlot, wantonly corrupting
innocent men? Does it appear to represent a conclusion that some
portion of the community's affairs are-and should continue to
be-run completely or primarily by men? That some kinds of
decisions are better left to men? If the answer to some of these
questions is yes, we would suggest that a prima facie case has
been made against the validity of the statute or practice in
question, as a denial of equal protection.
If the judge has reached this conclusion, then the next
question is whether there is a basis for the legislature's action
sufficient to overcome the initial finding that improper class
legislation may be involved. We have earlier suggested that a
classification based on sex is one which demands "scrutiny" as
"strict" as any other, including race. If the reader disagrees, he
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will probably concede that there must at least be a "rational
basis" for the discrimination. How does the judge ascertain
whether such a "rational basis" exists?
It is perhaps more appropriate to suggest what the judge
should not do in this regard. One suggestion would be to avoid
merely concluding (as some judges apparently do) that the
legislature must have had some reason, and whatever it was, it is
good enough. Certainly a presumption of validity attaches to any
legislative act, but when that presumption has been overcome
by a showing of unequal treatment, it should be incumbent on
the proponent of the act to demonstrate what its purpose was and
why that purpose justifies treating the sexes in an unequal
manner.
A second response to avoid is acquiescence in discrimination
merely on the ground that it may obviate some degree of expense
or inconvenience. An easy example is the jury statute considered
in the Hoyt case, which was supported by the argument that
calling only female volunteers would avoid the inconvenience
occasioned by calling women who would then claim exemption.
Another might be the claim of an educational institution that
requiring it to admit females would entail the burden of provid-
ing them with restroom and other facilities not currently avail-
able. In our view, a state's policy of discrimination is not
justifiable merely because it is more convenient or less expensive
than a nondiscriminatory policy. It would be cheaper and more
convenient to choose our President only from the citizens of one
particular state, to have only citizens of that state elect him and
to elect a new one only when the incumbent dies or retires. It
would also be cheaper and quicker to do away with trial by jury
in criminal cases. There are competing interests in both cases,
however, which are stronger than the mere desire for efficiency
and economy. The policy against sex discrimination should also
be strong enough to prevail in such a competition. While efficiency
and economy are in general "rational bases" for legislation, they
do not justify discrimination against individuals on the basis of
inborn characteristics which they are powerless to alter.
V
CONCLUSION
Having presented the results of our legal research, as well
as our own intuitive hypotheses about judicial attitudes in sex
discrimination cases, we would add only one item to a presenta-
tion perhaps already overlong. Freely conceding as we do that
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male judges are not unique in manifesting sexist habits of
thought but rather share them with most other males (even law
professors, ourselves included), have we any justification for
singling out the judiciary for special criticism?
The judge in American society occupies a position of unique
esteem in the eyes of his fellow citizens. In return for this
particular honor, the judge assumes a special burden of personal
responsibility for the fairness, objectivity and disinterestedness
of his approach to the legal issues presented to him for resolution.
This duty requires him, insofar as he is humanly able, to per-
form his judicial functions without yielding to the many prej-
udices and superstitions that influence other men in every aspect
of their daily lives. Just as the policeman's special role entitles
society to expect him not to react violently to taunts or expletives
that would incite most men to action, so the judge can fairly be
expected to free himself as nearly as possible from the limita-
tions of his personal attitudes about sex roles in cases involving
constitutional challenges to sex discrimination. The judicial role
must transcend social conditioning in such matters; in this re-
spect, the judge must be above other men.
Another aspect of the judicial role is the responsibility to be
ahead of other men. Judges are not entitled to the luxury of
shielding themselves behind public opinion or community atti-
tudes, however strongly held those may be. The judiciary thus
cannot shift responsibility to the legislatures, the press, women's
liberation activists or anyone else. Nor can it postpone affirmative
action until public opinion is overwhelmingly convinced that
the time is appropriate. A judge whose opinions on important
questions of public policy reflect nothing more than his private
estimate of public majority opinion is engaging in journalism, not
jurisprudence.
Our study has convinced us that, to date, most male Amer-
ican judges faced with issues of sex discrimination have not
adequately met these special responsibilities. There are, however,
some encouraging signs of progress. It is our hope that this study
will contribute to an increasing judicial understanding of and
sensitivity toward the serious constitutional issues raised by state
laws that discriminate against individuals solely on the basis of
their sex.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
October 1971]
HeinOnline -- 46 N.Y.U. L. Rev.  747 1971
